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SLAVERY AND THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
L. Scott Stafford
I. INTRODUCTION
Slavery existed within the boundaries of the present state of Arkansas as
early as 1720 when African slaves arrived with a group of German emigrants.
The colony soon failed, and most of the Germans and their slaves returned to
New Orleans. Throughout the remainder of the Eighteenth Century the number
of slaves at Arkansas Post, the only European settlement in the area that now
includes Arkansas, remained small.2 By 1798 there were only fifty-six African
slaves at Arkansas Post, although they constituted about fourteen percent of the
non-native population.3
Arkansas became a part of the United States in 1803 when the American
government purchased the Louisiana Territory from France. The first U.S.
census conducted in 1810 listed 136 slaves within the current state, 107 at
Arkansas Post and 29 at the settlements of Hope Field and St. Francis in
eastern Arkansas along the Mississippi River.4 In 1819 Congress created
Arkansas Territory, whose boundaries included the current state of Arkansas
and most of present-day Oklahoma. During the debate over legislation creating
the new territory, attempts by northern congressmen to bar the further
introduction of slaves into the territory failed by only a few votes.5 By the time
of the 1820 census there were 1617 slaves in a total population of 14,273.6
This was still an insignificant absolute number of slaves when compared with
southern states further east. In fact, there were fewer slaves living in Arkansas
in 1820 than in either New York or New Jersey.7 However, the future of
slavery in Arkansas was decided in 1820 when Congress approved the
Missouri Compromise establishing a demarcation line between slave and
* B.S.B.A., University of Arkansas, Fayetteville (1969); J.D., Harvard Law School
(1971); Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
1. ORVILLE W. TAYLOR, NEGRO SLAVERY IN ARKANSAS 5 (1958). The early French
settlers of Arkansas Post enslaved some Indians, but when the French transferred possession
of the area that now includes Arkansas to Spain in 1763, the Spanish prohibited future
enslavement of Indians. MORRIS S. ARNOLD, COLONIAL ARKANSAS, 1686-1704, at 65 (199 1).
2. The 1744 census showed 10 slaves, and the 1771 census showed 16 slaves. TAYLOR,
supra note 1, at 12 (citation omitted).
3. ARNOLD, supra note 1, at 65.
4. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 19. These figures do not include any of the 287 slaves
recorded in the New Madrid District, which straddled portions of the current states of Arkansas
and Missouri. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 20.
5. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 21.
6. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 25.
7. MICHAEL B. DOUGAN, ARKANSAS ODYSSEY 154 (1994). New York adopted a law in
1817 that abolished slavery beginning in 1827. 1817 N.Y. Laws 197. New Jersey gradually
abolished slavery in 1804. Act of February 15, 1804, 1804 N.J. Laws 103.
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nonslave states at 36 degrees, 30 minutes latitude, which ran along the northern
boundary of the state.' Under the terms of the Missouri Compromise, Arkansas
was admitted to the union as a slave state in 1836, and for the next twenty-eight
years, slavery remained legal in Arkansas.
The slave population of the state grew steadily during that period, both in
absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total population: 9
Slave Total Percentage
Census Population Population Slave
1820 1,617 14,255 11%
1830 4,576 30,388 15%
1840 19,935 97,574 20%
1850 47,100 209,897 22%
1860 111,115 435,450 26%
During the period between its admission as a state in 1836 and the
abolition of slavery by the Constitution of 1864, Arkansas developed a body
of constitutional law, statutory law, and common law dealing with the
institution of slavery. It was not sufficient for the law merely to recognize that
slavery was legal. The state was obliged to develop detailed rules regulating
the relationship between owner and slave, between slave and third parties, and
between a slave's owner and third parties. These rules had to be fitted into a
broader scheme of criminal, tort, property, and commercial law. Much of the
statutory framework for slavery was laid down in the 1837 session of the
Arkansas General Assembly." The session approved laws dealing with the
8. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 21-22.
9. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 47-58 (devoting an entire chapter to the demographics of the
slavery population in Arkansas).
10. The first General Assembly was elected in August of 1836 and met on the second
Monday in September 1836. ARK. CONST. of 1836, Schedule, § 7 and § 8. At that first session
the legislature authorized the governor to appoint two persons to revise and codify the laws of
the state, which at that time consisted of a polygenetic mix of statutes approved by the
legislative bodies of the Arkansas Territory, the Missouri Territory, and the Louisiana Territory.
Pursuant to that authorization, Sam C. Roane and William McK. Ball prepared a code of civil
and criminal laws, which was submitted to the October 1837 session of the General Assembly.
After making some amendments to the proposed codes, the legislature approved and published
the Revised Statutes of Arkansas in early 1838. See the preface to the Revised Statutes of
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criminal prosecution of slaves," dower rights in slaves, 2 the emancipation of
slaves, 13 gifts of slaves, 4 slave patrols," runaway slaves, 6 and detailed
regulations governing the conduct of slaves and third parties who dealt with
slaves. 17
However, it was not possible for the General Assembly to envision and
address every legal question spawned by the institution of slavery, and this lack
of comprehensive coverage forced the newly created Arkansas Supreme Court
to fill in the gaps. Unlike the courts in neighboring Louisiana, the Arkansas
court was too grounded in common law tradition to rely on the civil law for
assistance." Because slavery was never widespread in Great Britain, the
English common law also afforded limited guidance. 9 The Arkansas court did
at times compare the master-slave relationship to various relationships known
to the common law such as employer-employee, master-apprentice, father-son,
and husband-wife, but none of these common law relationships corresponded
precisely to that existing between an owner and a slave. To the extent it relied
on precedent, the Arkansas Supreme Court looked primarily to the decisions
of appellate courts in other slave states, but in several situations, the court
established legal precepts that were unique to Arkansas.
This article examines the Arkansas Supreme Court's development of a
common law of slavery during the brief period between statehood in 1836 and
the emancipation of slaves in 1864.20 Articles and books have addressed the
Arkansas at V-X(1838).
11. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 44, Art. IV (1838).
12. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 52, §§ 20-25 (1838).
13. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 56 (1838).
14. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 71 (1838).
15. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 109 (1838).
16. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 132 (1838).
17. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 142 (1838).
18. See Hans W. Baade, The Bifurcated Romanist Tradition of Slavery in Louisiana, 70
TuL. L. REV. 1481 (1996). The Romans developed a complicated set of rules to address the role
of slaves. Alan Watson, Thinking Property at Rome, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1355 (1993). This
complexity was unnecessary in the American South because the roles performed by slaves were
much more limited than in Rome. Jacob I. Corre, Thinking Property at Memphis: An
Application of Watson, 68 CIH.-KENT. L. REV. 1373 (1993).
19. See generally, William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of
Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. Ci. L. REV. 86 (1974) and Jonathan A. Bush,
Free to Enslave: The Foundations of Colonial American Slave Law, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
417 (1993). (At least one author, however, argues that significant portions of American slave
law can be traced to English precedents. See Bradley J. Nicholson, Legal Borrowing and the
Origins of Slave Law in the British Colonies, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38 (1994)).
20. The Emancipation Proclamation issued by President Abraham Lincoln on January 1,
1863, freed slaves within those areas controlled by the United States Army. On January 1,
1863, the vast majority of Arkansas slaves lived in areas under Confederate control and were
not officially freed until the adoption of the Constitution of 1864. See Graves v. Pinchback, 47
Ark. 470 (1886). Graves overruled sub silentio Jacoway v.Denton, 25 Ark. 625 (1869), appeal
1997] 415
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treatment of slavery by appellate courts in other states,2 but the Arkansas
experience is relatively unmined.2 When compared with the high courts of
states further east, the Arkansas Supreme Court had less opportunity to produce
an extensive body of law applicable to slavery. Arkansas was one of the last
slave states admitted to the union, and slavery was legal for less than three
decades after Arkansas became a state. Moreover, the supreme court was much
less active during the antebellum period than it is today. Between 1836 and
1864 it handed down few written decisions written decisions, and only a small
percentage of these dealt with slaves. From this small body of case law, it is
nevertheless possible to distill much about the court's attitude toward a group
of Arkansans who by 1860 constituted over one fourth the population of the
state.
A principal legal question confronted by courts in those states in which
slavery was legal was whether to treat slaves as property or as human beings.
Aristotle classified slaves as "thinking property, '23 and the term aptly portrays
the dilemma faced by courts in the slave states. Slaves were property that
could be bought, sold, pledged, gifted, devised, and seized by creditors, but
slaves were also rational human beings, capable of independent thought and
action, and these qualities created legal questions that did not arise with respect
to other forms of property. As the court itself put it in a postbellum reference
to the slave, "[h]e was a person and property, and capable of being acted upon
by law in either capacity, and therefore entitled to a position before the law that
could not be claimed for property that was purely chattels .... ,24 The
Arkansas Supreme Court was not consistent in its resolution of the property
versus person dilemma. In most situations it treated slaves as property, but it
sometimes recognized that slaves were also persons. Ironically, when the court
dismissed, 154 U.S. 583 (1872), which had held that Arkansas slaves in Arkansas became free
as they came under the control of the United States government.
21. See Daniel J. Flanigan, Criminal Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South,
40 J.S. LEGAL HIST. 537 (1974); Michael S. Hindus, Black Justice Under White Law: Criminal
Prosecutions of Blacks in Antebellum South Carolina, 63 J. AM. HIST. 575 (1976); A.E. Keir
Nash, The Texas Supreme Court and Trial Rights of Blacks, 1845-1860, 58 J. AM. HIST. 622
(1971); A.E. Keir Nash, Fairness and Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme
Courts of the Old South, 56 VA. L. REV. 64 (1970); A. E. Keir Nash, A More Equitable Past?
Southern Supreme Courts and the Protection of the Antebellum Negro, 48 N. C. L. REv. 197
(1970); Judith K. Schafer, The Long Arm of the Law: Slave Criminals and the Supreme Court
in Antebellum Louisiana, 60 TuL. L. REv. 1247 (1986).
22. U.S. District Judge Jacob Trieber published an article entitled Legal Status of Negroes
in Arkansas Before the Civil War, 3 PuB. ARK. HiST. ASS'N. 175 (1911), but it deals primarily
with statutory law regulating slaves and free blacks. See also, Florence R. Beatty-Brown, Legal
Status ofArkansas Negroes Before Emancipation, 28 ARK. HIST. Q. 6 (1969).
23. The phrase "thinking property" is used in Watson, supra note 18, at 1335. He
attributes it to ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Bk. 1, Ch. 4-6. See also id. at Bk. 1, Ch. 13.
24. Jacoway v. Denton, 25 Ark. 625, 628 (1869), appeal dismissed, 154 U.S. 583 (1872).
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did choose to treat a slave as a person, the result was usually detrimental to the
slave.
The court's response to the dual character of slaves was conditioned by
several concerns. Foremost in the minds of the justices was the need to justify
and preserve slavery as a legal institution. By the 1830s the southern states had
developed a siege mentality on the issue of slavery,25 and Arkansas was swept
up in the political passions rocking the country at the time it became a state.
The state's major newspapers bombarded their readers with proslavery
editorials throughout the territorial and antebellum periods. After 1835 the
Arkansas Gazette refused to print letters questioning slavery because
"mischievous consequences" might result if the legality of slavery was
questioned.26 Rumors of slave uprisings in eastern Arkansas kindled at least
two pogroms in which both blacks and whites suspected of abolitionist
sympathies were killed by mobs.27 The Methodist Church in particular was
considered "soft" on slavery,28 and several Methodist ministers were lynched
for questioning the morality of slavery.29 By 1858, the need to present a
monolithic front on the slavery issue prompted the Arkansas General Assembly
to pass a statute making it a crime for a free person "by speaking or writing,
[to] maintain that owners have not right of property in their slaves .... ,,30 This
repressive political climate placed enormous pressure on the Arkansas Supreme
Court to defend slavery as a legal institution when addressing slave-related
issues.
A second theme pervading many of the court's opinions was central to its
defense of slavery--a belief that blacks were inferior to whites. Southern
25. According to one school of history, support in the south for slavery solidified as a
result of four events in the period 1829-1832: the publication in 1829 of a pamphlet by David
Walker, a free black, urging an armed revolt by slaves; the publication in 1831 of the first
edition of William Lloyd Garrison's abolitionist magazine The Liberator, the Nat Turner
rebellion in 1831, which led to the death of 60 whites; and the Virginia Slavery Debates of
1831-32. Nash, A More Equitable Past? Southern Supreme Courts and the Protection of the
Antebellum Negro, supra note 21, at 212 (1970).
26. DOUGAN, supra note 7, at 154.
27. DOUGAN, supra note 7, at 167.
28. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 172-173.
29. DOUGAN, supra note 7, at 167.
30. Ark. Act of November 22, 1850, codified in GouLD's DIGEST, ch. 51, part VI, art. IV,§ 3 (1858). The suppression of free speech on the slavery question was common throughout
the south during the period before the Civil War. Michael K. Curtis, The 1859 Crisis over
Hinton Helper's Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the
Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1113, 1123-
41 (1993). After some equivocation, most northern states rejected attempts to suppress
abolitionist speech and press. See generally, Michael K. Curtis, The Curious History of
Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 Nw. U. L. REV.
785 (1995).
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slavery was often referred to as the "peculiar institution," and it was peculiar
in one respect. Slavery had existed since antiquity in many cultures, but
historically slavery had nothing to do with race. Slavery in the American
South, as well as elsewhere in the New World, was based on race, and the
theoretical justification for the enslavement of Africans was their alleged
inferiority to other races.3 ' The justices of the Arkansas Supreme Court
sincerely believed that:
There is a striking difference between the black and white man, in intellect,
feelings and principles. In the order of providence, the former was made
inferior to the latter; and hence the bondage of the one to the other. For
government and protection, the one race is dependent on the other. It is
32upon this principle alone, that slavery can be maintained as an institution.
Many of the court's decisions clearly and frankly reflect its perceived need to
maintain the white racial dominance that underpinned slavery.
A third major concern of the court was protection of the property interest
of the slave owner. Slaves were extremely valuable property. The average
Arkansas slave was worth as much as an eighty acre farm or a substantial city
residence.33 It is hardly surprising that the supreme court would approach
many legal questions involving slaves from the economic perspective of the
slave owner. The court was only indirectly responsible to the general
electorate. It consisted of three justices elected to eight year terms by the
General Assembly.34 During the years prior to the Civil War, the plantation
owners of eastern and southern Arkansas dominated the legislative branch of
government 5 and were doubtlessly in a position to ensure that justices named
to the court were sympathetic to the property interests of slave owners.
Moreover, many of the early supreme court justices were themselves the
owners of slaves. Daniel Ringo, who served as Chief Justice of the court from
1836 to 1844,36 and David Walker, who was Associate Justice from 1848
through 1855, 37 were both listed in the 1850 census as major owners of
31. See Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of the Peculiar Institution in American Legal
Development, 68 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 1009, 1011-1016 (1993).
32. Ewell v. Tidwell, 20 Ark. 136, 144 (1859).
33. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 78-79, n. 79. Taylor also notes that slaves were more
valuable in Arkansas than in states further east. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 78.
34. ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. VI, §§ 2 & 7.
35. According to the official history of the state, "Four or five hundred planters who
owned most of the slaves had practically run the political affairs of the State" during the pre-
Civil War period. ARKANSAS AND ITs PEOPLE 115 (David Y. Thomas ed., 1930). Dougan
attributes the political ascendancy of the planters to the fact that they were the wealthiest and
best educated group in a primarily frontier economy. DOUGAN, supra note 7, at 153, 172.
36. 1986 HISTORICAL REP. OF SECRETARY OF STATE-ARKANSAS 450.
37. Id.at451.
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slaves.3" Chief Justice Elbert H. English, who served from 1854 until the
adoption of the Constitution of 1864,' 9 was also a slave owner.40
A final concern that influenced the court's decisions was the tension
between those Arkansans who owned slaves and those who did not. Even
though the slave population of Arkansas grew steadily during the period before
the Civil War, the vast majority of white Arkansans did not own slaves. Even
in 1860, when the slave population peaked, less than four percent of the white
population owned slaves.' Since those who did not own slaves tended to be
poor and unlettered, they left a meager written record of their attitude toward
slavery, but they almost certainly envied and resented their richer, slave-
owning neighbors. Slave owners were the primary proponents of statehood,
and evidence of the divisicn between those who owned slaves and those who
did not was apparent in an anonymous 1835 letter to a Little Rock newspaper
opposing statehood:
Of the whole white population, for one who has twenty slaves, we will find
you twenty who have no slaves. The one, then, will be the sufferer by the
abolition of slavery in the Territory, and to enable him to loll in ease and
affluence and to save his own delicate hands from the rude contact of the
vulgar plow, the twenty who earn their honest living by the sweat of the
brow are called upon with the voice of authority assumed by wealth to
receive the yoke. They must consent to a tenfold increase of tax for the
support of a state government, because my lord is threatened with danger
of desertion from his cotton field if we remain as we are.42
It would go too far to suggest that any sizable number of Arkansans
favored the abolition of slavery. Most probably supported slavery,43 particu-
larly in light of the political climate discussed above, but a non-slaveowner
who was the victim of a crime or tort committed by a slave was unlikely to be
overly concerned about the property interests of the slave's owner. Although
somewhat insulated from the electorate by the manner in which they were
selected, supreme court justices could not entirely ignore the interests of those
Arkansans who did not own slaves when deciding slave-related questions.
38. Robert B. Walz, Arkansas Slaveholdings and Slaveholders in 1850, 12 ARK. HIST. Q.
38 (1953) (containing a directory of 522 Arkansans who owned twenty or more slaves in 1850).
39. 1986 HISTORICAL REP. OF SECRETARY OF STATE-ARKANSAS 450.
40. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 54.
41. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 56. Out of an 1860 white population of 324,143, there were
11,481 slave owners, or approximately 3.5 percent. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 56. The number
of persons who were members of slave owning families was obviously greater than 3.5 percent.
42. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 38 (quoting Times (Little Rock), June 13, 1835).
43. Dougan states that support for slavery in Arkansas cut across class lines. DOUGAN,
supra note 7, at 154.
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H. SLAVES AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
For purposes of the criminal law, a slave was regarded as a person and
was subject to prosecution by the state for breaking the law. The supreme
court explained the reason for so treating slaves in an 1856 case:
The slave, however, is a human being--he is regarded as a rational
creature-a moral agent. He, as well as the master, is the subject of
government and amenable to the laws of God and man."
But a slave was also a valuable piece of property, and a criminal prosecution
of a slave placed in jeopardy both the person of the slave and the property of
the owner. For this reason, the criminal codes of many slave states established
special procedures to protect the property interests of owners when slaves were
prosecuted for crimes. In Louisiana, slaves accused of crimes were tried by a
special court consisting of two justices of the peace and ten slave owners.45
South Carolina employed a similar system but with a smaller number of slave
owners." Virginia tried slaves before four or more justices of the peace who
could not impose the death penalty unless a majority of the court, but no less
than four justices, concurred.47 Other states provided for slaves to be tried by
juries but took steps to ensure that slave owners were represented on juries.
North Carolina required all jurors in a slave's trial to be slaveholders.4" When
it was admitted to the Union in 1791, Tennessee initially followed the North
Carolina model but was forced to abandon the requirement in 1836 when it
proved difficult to find twelve slaveholders to hear every case in which a slave
was accused of a crime.49 In 1836 Alabama adopted a statute requiring half of
the panel summoned for jury duty to be slave owners; this was later modified
to require two-thirds of the jurors actually chosen to be slaveholders50
44. Sarah v. State, 18 Ark. 114, 117 (1856).
45. Judith K. Schafer, The Long Arm of the Law: Slave Criminals and the Supreme Court
in Antebellum Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1247 (1986) describes the special slave courts used
in Louisiana.
46. Capital offenses were heard by two justices of the peace sitting with three to five slave
owners. One justice of the peace and two slave owners could hear noncapital cases. The law
was later changed to require a minimum of three slave owners. THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN
SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860 (1996), at 215.
47. MORRIS, supra note 46, at 214. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, The
'Law Only as an Enemy': The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial
and Antebellum CriminalLaws of Virginia, 70 N. C. L. REv. 969, 984-87 (1992). In 1819 the
law was amended to require a unanimous verdict to impose a death sentence. Id. at 993.
48. MORRIS, supra note 46, at 218.
49. MORRIS, supra note 46, at 218.
50. MORRIS, supra note 46, at 218.
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In contrast to most southern states Arkansas did not establish special
courts or procedures to try slaves accused of crimes. Article IV, section 25 of
the Constitution of 1836 specifically guaranteed slaves the right to trial by an
impartial jury,5 and the first General Assembly adopted a statute providing that
slaves who committed felonies "shall be tried in the same court, and the same
rules of evidence observed, as in cases of white persons committing the like
offense. 5 2 The law did not mandate that slave owners be represented on juries
that tried slaves. Such a requirement would have posed problems in the
northwest part of the state where the number of slave owners was relatively
low. More importantly, it would have deprived slaves of the "impartial jury"
guaranteed by the Arkansas Constitution.
Article IV, Section 25 of the Constitution of 1836 also required courts
before whom slaves were tried to assign them counsel for their defense.
Arkansas was one of the few states in which a slave's right to assigned counsel
was constitutionally guaranteed.53 Under Article II, § 11 of the Constitution
free persons charged with offenses in Arkansas courts had the right to retain
counsel of their choice, but the constitution was silent on their right to assigned
counsel.54 Neither the statutory law nor the case law clearly identified who
51. Since the proposed constitution was presented to Congress at the same time as the
petition for statehood, the purpose of this provision may have been to assuage opposition to
admission of Arkansas as a slave state. The sponsor of the legislation admitting Arkansas, then
senator and future president James Buchanan, argued that by securing for slaves the right to a
trial by jury, the proposed constitution placed slaves on an equal footing with whites. TAYLOR,
supra note 1, at 45.
52. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 44, art. III, § 6 (1838). In trials of slaves, the rules of evidence
were relaxed in at least one respect. A slave was not a competent witness in a criminal trial of
a white person, but a slave could testify when the accused was another slave. Id. at ch. 158, §
25. Permitting slaves to testify for and against other slaves was probably prompted by practical
considerations rather than concerns about procedural fairness. Barring the testimony of slaves
in the criminal trials of other slaves would in many cases exclude the testimony of the only
witnesses to a crime. See Thomas D. Morris, Slaves and the Rules of Evidence in Criminal
Trials, 68 CL.-KENT L. REv. 1209, 1215 (1993).
53. Several states had statutes requiring the owner to furnish counsel. MORRIs, supra note
46, at 252. Virginia required that counsel be assigned to defend slaves accused of capital
offenses. In Higginbotham & Jacobs, supra note 47, at 1014, the authors suggest that the
Virginia legislature provided counsel to slaves in capital cases because of concern about the
state's obligation to reimburse owners of executed slaves. Arkansas did not compensate the
owner of an executed slave, so it is unlikely that a similar concern explains the right of
Arkansas slaves to appointed counsel. By including the special protection for Arkansas slaves
accused of crimes in the constitution, the drafters of the proposed constitution may have hoped
to make the proposed document more attractive to Northern members of Congress. See supra
note 51.
54. The General Assembly did pass legislation requiring a trial court to assign counsel to
any person charged with a felony who was unable to employ counsel. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 45,
§ 112 (1838). In Brown v. State, 12 Ark. 623 (1852), the court ruled that when the trial record
was silent, it was presumed that the trial court had assigned counsel to defendant.
1997]
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paid for the legal defense of a slave, but in all likelihood the attorney fees were
taxed as a cost of the case. This meant that the county paid the cost of defense
if the slave was acquitted. If the slave was convicted, the slave owner was
offered the opportunity to pay costs, and if he failed to do so, the slave was
sold and the costs paid from the proceeds of the sale." If a slave was convicted
of a capital offense and executed, the county paid the costs. 56 In any event, as
a result of the constitutional guarantee of counsel, slaves accused of crimes in
Arkansas courts were often defended by the ablest members of the Arkansas
bar.
A. Slaves as Criminal Defendants in Capital Cases
The Constitution of 1836 specifically addressed the imposition of capital
punishment on slaves. It provided that any slave convicted of a capital offense
was to "suffer the same degree of punishment as would be inflicted on a free
white person, and no other. 57 In an 1850 opinion,58 the supreme court
construed the provision as requiring that the same method of capital punish-
ment be applied to all persons, whether slave or free:
If the offence charged against [a slave] had been declared capital, whether
committed by a white man or a negro, but that, in the case of the former,
the mode of execution should be by hanging by the neck, whereas the latter
should first be scourged, and then burned, and finally destroyed by
hanging, there can be no doubt but that such act would be unconstitutional
and consequently void. The provision was doubtless inserted in the
constitution from a feeling of humanity towards the unfortunate African
race, and in order to secure them against that barbarous treatment and
excessive cruelty which was practiced upon them in the earlier period of
our colonial history."
The court went on to rule, however, that the constitution did not preclude the
legislature from identifying offenses that were punishable by death only when
committed by slaves.'
The General Assembly exercised sparingly the power to single out slaves
for capital punishment.6' Responding no doubt to white concern with sexual
55. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 45, §§ 209-211 (1838).
56. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 45, § 212 (1838).
57. ARK. CONsT. of 1836 art. IV, § 25.
58. Charles v. State, 11 Ark. 389 (1850).
59. Id. at 404-405.
60. Id. at 404.
61. By contrast, slaves in Virginia could receive the death penalty for at least sixty-eight
offenses that were not considered capital offenses when committed by a white person.
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relations between black men and white women, the legislature made it a capital
offense for a person of African descent to commit certain sexual offenses. The
antebellum criminal code imposed the death penalty on whites convicted of
forcible rape of a white woman, 62 but whites convicted of statutory rape 63 or
sodomy6 were punished by imprisonment for not less than five years nor more
than twenty-one years.65 The code provided, however, that:
If any negro or mulatto shall commit any of the before enumerated
offenses, which are punishable by death, or shall commit the infamous
crime against nature, with man or beast, he shall be punished by death, and
if such negro or mulatto shall attempt to commit any of such offenses,
although he may not succeed, on a white woman, he shall suffer death on
conviction thereof.
6
Slaves accused of capital offenses fared rather well before the supreme
court.67 During the period that slavery was legal in Arkansas, the court heard
six appeals by slaves sentenced to death for crimes against white persons. It
upheld only one conviction; the other five were reversed.68 This success rate
Higginbotham & Jacobs, supra note 47, at 977.
After passage of the Penitentiary Act of 1838 persons convicted of second degree murder
were punished by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than twenty-one years.
GOULD'S DIGEST ch. 51, pt. IV, art. I, § 8 (1848). Since slaves were not subject to
imprisonment in the penitentiary, a slave could not be convicted of second degree murder. The
inability of the jury to convict a slave of the lesser included offense of second degree murder
probably increased the chances that a slave accused of murder would receive the death penalty.
62. ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 51,pt. IV, art. IV, § 2 (1848); GOULD'S DIGEST, ch. 51, pt. IV,
art. IV, § 2 (1858). The Penitentiary Act, passed on December 17, 1838, provided that a white
man convicted of forcible rape was subject to imprisonment The punishment for forcible rape
by a white man was changed to death by legislation approved December 14, 1842. See Dennis
v. State, 5 Ark. 230 (1843).
The forcible rape statute did not specifically exclude slave women from its protection,
but Taylor is clearly correct when he states, "Legally, there was no such thing as the rape of a
slave woman by a white man." TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 201. See also MORRIS, supra note 46,
at 306. Slaves in other states were sometimes charged with the rape of a slave woman, MORRIS,
supra note 46, at 306, but there is no reported case of such a prosecution in Arkansas.
63. Statutory rape was defined as sexual intercourse with a female under the age of
puberty. ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 51, pt. IV, art. IV, § 4 (1848); GOULD'S DIGEST ch. 51, pt. IV,
art. IV, § 4 (1858).
64. Neither sodomy nor buggery was defined by statute.
65. ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 51, pt. IV, art. IV, § 5 (1848); GOULD'S DIGEST ch. 51, pt. IV,
art. IV, § 5 (1858).
66. Penitentiary Act of December 17, 1838, codified as ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 51, pt. IV,
art. IV, § 9 (1848); GOuLD's DIGEST ch. 51, pt. IV, art. IV, § 9 (1858).
67. Slaves accused of capital crimes were often the victims of vigilante justice. Taylor
describes several lynchings of slaves who allegedly committed murder or rape. TAYLOR, supra
note 1, at 235-36.
68. One slave was tried twice for a capital offense and successfully appealed both
convictions. See infra text accompanying notes 112-124.
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is surprising, particularly when compared with the reversal rate for blacks
sentenced to death in the years since the Civil War.69
Only one of the six death penalty appeals heard by the high court involved
the prosecution of a slave for murder. In Austin v. State70 the defendant was in
the process of escaping from his owner when he was stopped by the owner and
a group of white men.71 The owner ordered Austin to lay down an axe he was
carrying.72 Austin replied that he would not be whipped by the owner or
anyone else, and that he would kill the first man that attempted to take him.
73
As Austin continued talking with his owner, one of the other white men, Hiram
Payne, attacked Austin from behind with a pine plank.74 Austin warded off
Payne's blow with his left arm, and with his right arm struck Payne in the head
with the axe, inflicting a wound from which Payne later died.75 Austin was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death.76
Austin appealed, citing among other errors the trial court's refusal to
permit his owner to testify as a defense witness. 77 During the twelve months
before the Austin appeal, the supreme court had ruled in three different civil
cases that a person with a pecuniary interest in the outcome of a civil case was
not a competent witness.78 The question raised by Austin's appeal was whether
the pecuniary interest rule should be extended to a criminal case. If a slave was
simply another type of property, the solution was straightforward-the
pecuniary interest rule should apply to bar the testimony of the slave's owner.
The problem was that applying the pecuniary interest rule to criminal cases
would primarily impact slaves accused of criminal offenses. Rarely would a
witness in the prosecution of a free person have the type of direct pecuniary
interest in the outcome of the prosecution that would bar the witness's
testimony. The Austin opinion conjectured that a father might have an interest
in the services of a minor son accused of a crime, or a master might have an
interest in the future services of an apprentice. 79 By contrast, the pecuniary
69. During the antebellum period the court heard four appeals from free persons convicted
of capital offenses. It reversed convictions in Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229 (1840) and Bivens v.
State, 11 Ark. 455 (1850); and affirmed death sentences in Shropshire v. State, 12 Ark. 190
(1851) and Doghead Glory v. State, 13 Ark. 236 (1853).
70. 14 Ark. 555 (1854).
71. Austin, 14 Ark. at 559.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 558.
77. Id. at 563.
78. Scott v. Jester, 13 Ark. 437 (1853); Turner v. Huggins, 14 Ark. 21 (1853); Carnall v.
Wilson, 14 Ark. 482 (1854).
79. Austin, 14 Ark. at 564-565.
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interest rule would bar the owner's testimony in every criminal prosecution of
a slave. 0
The supreme court ruled that the trial judge erred when he barred
testimony by Austin's owner, but whether it did so out of concern for Austin's
procedural rights or his owner's procedural rights is unclear. The court
purported to be concerned about the fairness of denying to a slave the benefit
of his owner's testimony because it quoted the following language from a
Mississippi decision:
The master has the custody of his slave and owes to him protection, and it
would be a rigorous rule indeed if the master could not be a witness in
behalf of his slave. What would be the condition of the slave, if the rule
which binds him to perpetual servitude, should also create such an interest
in the master as to deprive him of the testimony of that master? The
hardships of such a rule will illy (sic) comport with that humanity which
should be extended to that race of people. In prosecutions for offences,
negroes are to be treated as other persons: and although the master may
have had an interest in his servant, yet the servant had such an interest in
the testimony of his master as will outweigh mere pecuniary consider-
ations, nor can he be deprived of the benefit of that testimony by the mere
circumstance that in a civil point of view he was regarded by the law as
property."
This passage, which emphasizes fairness to the slave as a person, was
counterbalanced by a second quote from a Tennessee decision which suggests
that the court was also concerned with protecting the property rights of the
slave owner:
[T]he law, upon high grounds of public policy, pretermits for a moment
that relation (of slave and master), takes the slave out of the hands of his
master, forgets his claims and rights of property, treats the slave as a
rational and intelligent human being, responsible to moral, social and
municipal duties and obligations and gives him the benefit of all the forms
of trial which jealousy of power and love of liberty have induced a freeman
to throw around himself for his own protection. If then the master knows
any fact tending to save the life of the slave, shall society, who have taken
from him the slave for the purpose of trial, say to him, not that you are
master, and we will weigh your credit, but you are master and shall not
speak at all! On grounds of public policy, of common humanity, of
80. Barring the owner's testimony could cut both ways. In some cases, the owner would
be the best, if not the only, witness to a slave's crime.
81. Austin at 566 (quoting Isham v. State, 7 Miss. (6 How. Rep.) 35 (1841)).
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absolute necessity, the master must be held to be competent as a witness
for or'against the slave. 2
The defense in Austin also challenged the trial court's instruction to the
jury distinguishing murder from manslaughter.83 Austin struck the blow that
killed Payne after the latter attacked him with a stick. Under Arkansas law,
then and now, an assault and battery against the defendant was considered
provocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter. 4 The trial court,
however, had given an instruction to the effect that if Austin was acting in
rebellion to his master, then he was guilty of murder "even although the
striking of the defendant by Payne would have been evidence to show an
extenuation of the killing of Payne by the defendant from murder to man-
slaughter.""
The lower court's manslaughter instruction in Austin provided a second
opportunity for the supreme court to address the property versus person issue.
If a slave was a rational human being, answerable to the state when he
committed a crime, then his conduct should be excused or mitigated when he
succumbed to normal human passions and emotions. But the court rejected this
analysis in favor of one that stressed the need to safeguard the slave's character
as property:
[T]he tranquility of the public at large, the security of the master, the value
of the slave as property, and the just protection and comfort of the slave
himself, all depend so essentially upon his entire subordination to the
lawful authority of his master, that we would hesitate long before we
would declare otherwise than that the principle, laid down in this charge,
was any other than a sound general principle of the common law of
slavery, as it exists in our slave States.... And when a slave is in rebellion
to the lawful authority of his master, whatever force may be necessary to
bring him within the pale of subordination, graduated upon principles of
law and humanity, let it come from what quarter it may, invades no right
of the slave, and consequently does him no wrong as the law can recognize
as a mitigation or excuse for crime. 6
82. Quoting from Elijah v. State, 20 Tenn. 99 (1 Hum. 102) (1839).
83. Austin, 14 Ark. at 567.
84. ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 51, pt. IV, art. II, § 2 (1848) provided: "Manslaughter must be
voluntary, upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by provocation, apparently sufficient to make
the passion irresistible." By providing that a slave convicted of manslaughter was to be
imprisoned not exceeding seven years, the criminal code recognized that a slave could be
convicted of manslaughter. Id. at ch. 51, pt. XII, § 9.
85. Austin, 14 Ark. at 567.
86. Austin, 14 Ark. at 567-68 (citation omitted).
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Subordination of slaves was too essential to the preservation of the institution
of slavery for the law to recognize that slaves were persons, subject to the same
emotions and reactions as white persons. Two consequences flowed from the
court's decision to emphasize the importance of slaves as property. First, any
white person, not just the slave's owner, was legally justified in using physical
force to overcome a slave's rebellion. Second, it was very unlikely that a slave
who killed a white person would be convicted of voluntary manslaughter.
Since a slave could not be convicted of second degree murder under the
Arkansas criminal code, this meant that a jury considering the fate of a slave
charged with murder had two choices--convict of a capital offense or acquit.
87
The other five death penalty appeals heard by the antebellum court
involved convictions of slaves for sexual offenses against white women.
Although it upheld a conviction for rape in Dennis v. State,8 it reversed four
convictions for attempted rape.89 The first reversal occurred in Sullivant v.
State.90 The prosecutrix testified that she awoke in the middle of the night and
upon extending her hand felt some person over her "in the act of committing
a rape."9' When she touched the intruder, he sprang from the bed and ran out
the door.92 The defendant was later brought to the prosecutrix's home where
his feet were determined to fit the tracks left by the intruder.93 In a statement
recorded by a justice of the peace, the defendant admitted having entered the
woman's house on the evening of the incident and staying about one hour.94
One of the guards who conducted the defendant to jail following his arraign-
ment testified that the defendant admitted his guilt even though he had pled not
guilty at the arraignment.95 The jury convicted Sullivant, and the trial court
sentenced him to be hanged.96
On appeal the supreme court reversed the conviction, citing a number of
procedural errors in an opinion that strikes the modem reader as unduly
formalistic. The indictment was defective because it charged that the defendant
87. Morris, who examined thousands of antebellum homicide cases, could not find a single
instance of a slave being convicted of the manslaughter of a white person. Every case in which
a slave was charged with the homicide of a white person ended in a murder conviction or a not
guilty verdict. MoRRIs, supra note 46, at 292.
88. 5 Ark. 230 (1843).
89. As explained supra text accompanying note 66, attempted rape was a capital offense
only when committed by a person of African descent.
90. 8 Ark. 400 (1848).
91. Id. at 401.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 402.
94. Id. at 402-403.
95. Id. at 403.
96. Id. at 401.
1997]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
"did feloniously attempt to commit a rape on one Emeranda Clemens, a white
woman." This failed to charge the facts and circumstances constituting the
crime with sufficient certainty to apprise the defendant of the charges against
him.
The indictment ... not only fails to charge that the defendant assaulted
Emeranda Clemens, and attempted to ravish and carnally know her forcibly
and against her will, but it utterly fails to charge any assault whatever.
These are facts that enter into the very essence and definition of the crime,
and an indictment in which they are not alleged is consequently a mere
nullity."
The court also found that the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient
to prove the crime of rape. Clemens testified that the party who invaded her
home attempted to rape her. This the court characterized as a conclusion of law
which invaded the province of the jury. The witness should have simply stated
the facts, and allowed the jury, under instructions from the court, to determine
whether those facts constituted an attempted rape.98 Finally, the court termed
the conviction deficient because there was no evidence that the alleged offense
took place in Dallas County.99
Two years later the court reviewed a conviction in Charles v. State..0
involving somewhat similar factual circumstances. The defendant in that case
was a slave charged with the attempted rape of a fourteen year old white girl.''
The victim testified that she was sleeping on the floor of a house with several
other young school girls, when a partially undressed man took hold of her
shoulder and turned her over.102 She grabbed the man and called for help, but
the man pulled away from her and left the room.'0 3 The owner of the house in
which the girl was sleeping testified that he was awakened by the girl's cries
and upon entering the room discovered the front door partially open.'l° He
followed bare footprints in the mud from the door to a cabin about twenty
97. Id. at 404-05. During these early years, indictments were strictly construed. See, e.g.,
State v. Hand, 6 Ark. 165 (1846), in which the court ruled that an indictment omitting the
defendant's last name in one allegation was defective even though the defendant's full name
was included at two other places in the indictment. Id. at 166-167. Defective indictments led
to the reversal of slave convictions in a number of other southern states. See Nash, Fairness
and Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme Courts of the Old South, supra note
21, at 79-81.
98. Sullivant, 8 Ark. at 406.
99. Id.
100. 11 Ark. 389 (1850).
101. Id. at 390.
102. Id. at 392.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 393.
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paces away in which he found the defendant feigning sleep.1"5 With the
assistance of his son and a minister who was also spending the night in the
house, the owner tied the defendant to a post and sent for the defendant's
owner."6 While awaiting the arrival of the owner, the defendant admitted to
taking two $5 gold pieces from pants in the same room several nights earlier.10 7
The following morning, while he was still tied with a rope and his legs were
chained, the defendant told a doctor that he had entered the room in which the
girls were sleeping to wake the owner of the house and warn him that someone
was at the barn stealing corn.' Based on this testimony the jury convicted the
defendant, and the court sentenced him to be hanged.' 9
The defendant appealed, and the supreme court reversed the conviction
because the evidence failed to show that the defendant intended to use force
against the victim if she resisted his advances:
It is certain that the accused in this case used no force, nor is it probable,
from all the surrounding circumstances, that the idea of force entered into
his original design, and in case his intention was to effect his purpose while
she was asleep, the authority cited shows that he is not guilty of the offence
charged against him. We do not think that the testimony evinced that
settled purpose to use force, and to act in disregard of the will of the
prosecutrix, which the law contemplates as essential to constitute the
crime. 10
This reasoning can be contrasted with that in decisions rendered after the Civil
War in which the court upheld attempted rape convictions despite evidence that
the victim was asleep at the time of the alleged act."'
Pleasant v. State,"2 the last of the attempted rape cases, was appealed
twice to the supreme court. In the first trial the prosecutrix, whose name was
Sophia Fulmer, testified that the defendant came to her house, threw her to the
ground several times, threw her on the bed, pulled her clothes over her head,
and got upon her."' By drawing up her legs and otherwise resisting him, she
was able to prevent his penetrating her body."4 The defendant then left, and
105. Id. at 393-94.
106. Id. at 389.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 395.
109. Id. at 391.
110. d. at410.
111. Harvey v. State, 53 Ark. 425, 14 S.W. 645 (1890); Maupin v. State, 54 Ark. 5, 14
S.W. 924 (1890).
112. 13 Ark. 360 (1853).
113. Id. at363.
114. Id.
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Fulmer ran about a half-mile to a mill and reported the incident."5 There was
also testimony showing that Fulmer and her husband agreed to drop the
prosecution in exchange for the payment of $125 by the slave's owner." 6 The
jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the trial court imposed a death sentence." 7
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the conviction for several reasons,
the most important of which was the failure of the state to present evidence that
the prosecutrix was white. The court conceded "a strong moral conviction"" 8
that the prosecutrix was a white woman and agreed that the jurors observed
Fulmer when she testified and might have inferred her race from their own
inspection of her appearance." 9 The court noted, however, that "a fair
complexion is not inconsistent with the taint of negro blood"'' 0 and ruled that
the state must offer some testimony that Fulmer was white: "Her own
statement, to that effect, or that of any witness who knew her, though matter of
opinion founded on her appearance, might be sufficient to satisfy the allegation
of the indictment.''
On remand, the defendant was successful in getting venue changed to
Ouachita County. Fulmer's testimony regarding the alleged attack was
generally consistent with her testimony in the first trial. The alleged attempt
by the slave's owner to settle the matter privately was more extensively
developed than in the first trial. The owner negotiated with Fulmer's husband
and a man named Landers, to whom the husband was indebted. Fulmer and
her husband eventually agreed not to appear against the defendant in exchange
for the payment of $50 to Landers and $75 to Fulmer and her husband. The
owner and Landers went to authorities to stop the prosecution but were
unsuccessful in getting the charges dropped.
In the second trial the defense strongly attacked the character of the
prosecutrix. The court permitted several defense witnesses to testify that her
reputation for chastity and virtue were bad, but it ruled out a number of
questions designed to elicit testimony of specific instances of improper
behavior. The second jury also convicted Pleasant, and the trial court again
sentenced him to be hanged.
In the second appeal the defense raised numerous pro forma objections to
rulings or instructions of the trial court, all of which were rejected by the
supreme court.22 The defense also objected to the court's refusal to permit
115. Id.
116. Id. at 365.
117. Id. at369.
118. Id. at 375.
119. Id. at376.
120. Id. at 376.
121. Id.
122. Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624 (1855).
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testimony of specific bad behavior by Fulmer. The court, after an extensive
discussion of English authority as well as cases from other American states,
concluded that the defense in a rape prosecution could offer evidence of the
prosecutrix's general reputation for chastity and virtue but not evidence of
specific instances of unchastity or of "criminal connections" with any person
except the defendant.lu2 The trial court had barred at least one defense witness
from testifying about the general character of Mrs. Fulmer for chastity, and the
high court ruled that excluding this evidence constituted reversible error. The
trial court had also excluded the testimony of the slave's owner, presumably
because the owner had a pecuniary interest in the prosecution. Because the
court had recently ruled in Austin v. State124 that the owner of a slave was
competent to testify was a witness for his slave, this also constituted reversible
error.
In overturning death sentences in these five appeals, the Arkansas
Supreme Court displayed an extraordinary solicitude for the procedural rights
of slaves accused of crimes. One possible explanation for this record is that the
Arkansas high court was genuinely concerned with ensuring procedural
fairness for the slaves. At least two scholars have argued that southern
appellate courts were generally protective of the procedural rights of slave
defendants. 125 In the absence of an English common law of slavery, the
Arkansas court often looked to the decisions of other slave states for precedent,
and the Arkansas experience may be a reflection of this broader pattern of
concern.
Alternatively, the Arkansas Supreme Court's concern for procedural
fairness to slave owners, not slaves, may explain the unusual appellate success
of slaves convicted of capital offenses. When a slave was convicted of a capital
offense and executed, the owner incurred a large financial loss.126 This gave
the owner a substantial incentive to come to the defense of a slave accused of
a capital offense and explains the active involvement of the owner in behalf of
his slave in both Pleasant v. State127 and Austin v. State.121 An 1854 letter to
the Arkansas Gazette - Democrat indicates that some owners resorted to more
123. Id. at 648.
124. 14 Ark. 555 (1854). The case is discussed supra at note 70.
125. See Flanigan, supra note 21, and Nash, supra note 21. This benevolent view of
antebellum appellate courts is questioned in Higginbotham & Jacobs, supra note 47.
126. Abraham v. Gray, 14 Ark. 301 (1853), describes a slave owner who lost more.
Edwards purchased a slave from Gray by delivering to Gray a promissory note for one thousand
dollars. The slave subsequently killed Edwards and was tried and executed for the murder.
Gray brought suit on the note against Edwards's executor, who defended on the grounds of
failure of consideration. The supreme court ruled that Edwards acquired valid title to the slave
and that his estate was obligated to pay the promissory note. Id. at 303-04.
127. 15 Ark. 624 (1855).
128. 14 Ark. 555 (1854).
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radical measures to save their investment in a slave accused of a capital
offense:
In order to punish negroes, who are guilty of great crimes, and prevent
their masters from running them off before they are convicted, it is
necessary to pass a law to pay the master one-half or two thirds of the
value of such negroes as are condemned and executed. This is done in
most of the States by a tax on slaves, which all slaveholders are ready and
willing to pay; but such is our constitution that no tax can be levied for this
purpose, on slaves, without at the same time, being levied on all other
property, and this would be unjust, therefore the law to pay for slaves has
never been passed though much needed." 9
Whether for the reason stated in the letter or for other reasons, Arkansas never
enacted a procedure for compensating the owners of executed slaves. The fact
that owners were not compensated for executed slaves may have inclined the
supreme court to insist that the state comply scrupulously with procedural
technicalities before it took valuable property from an owner.
B. Slaves as Criminal Defendants in Noncapital Cases
Slaves committed assault, arson, theft, and other crimes that were not
punishable by death. Owners or overseers often disciplined slaves for minor
offenses without resorting to the courts, but more serious offenses were
prosecuted by the state, particularly if the victim was a third party. 3° The
Arkansas Supreme Court considered several convictions of slaves for
noncapital offenses. Even though the slave's life was not at stake, the appeals
often raised the property-versus-person question. When a slave was convicted
of a noncapital offense, the owner did not lose valuable property, but was
deprived of the slave's services and might be forced to pay the court costs.' 3'
The Constitution of 1836 did not address the punishment for slaves convicted
of non-capital offenses, and criminal code penalties for slaves often differed
from those meted out to white convicts. The 1837 General Assembly adopted
numerous criminal statutes defining offenses punishable by imprisonment, fine,
and public whipping. Initially the law applied these punishments to all
persons, whether free or slave.'32 However, by 1838 the state built its first
129. ARKANSASGAZETrE, July 14, 1854, at 2.
130. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 203. See also MORRIS, supra note 46, at 249-25 1.
131. Technically, the costs of prosecuting a slave were not assessed against the owner, but
a slave convicted of an offense could be sold to pay court costs not paid by the owner. See
supra note 55.
132. Only white persons were subject to fines. A slave convicted of an offense punishable
by fine could receive only corporal punishment. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 44, div. VIII, art. III, § 2
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penitentiary in Little Rock,133 and late that year, the legislature passed the
Penitentiary Act, which modified the penal code to conform to the availability
of a state facility in which to incarcerate prisoners.134 Section 10 of the
Penitentiary Act excepted slaves from imprisonment in the penitentiary and
stated that they were to be punished "according to the law heretofore
enacted."' 35 Because the Penitentiary Act in general lengthened the terms of
imprisonment for various noncapital offenses, the effect of the legislation was
to subject whites to a longer period of imprisonment than slaves convicted of
(1838).
133. DOUGAN, supra note 7, at 89.
134. Law of December 17, 1838.
135. Id. codified at ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 51, pt. XII, § 7 (1848); GOULD'S DIGEST ch. 51,
pt. XII, § 7 (1858). After 1849, runaway slaves not claimed by their owners were sent to the
penitentiary, but they were held there by the state as slaves for life, not as inmates. GOULD'S
DIGEST Ch. 162, art. III, § 17 (1858).
1997]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
the same offense. The following chart136 compares the imprisonment
applicable to white convicts versus slave convicts during most of the antebel-
lum period:
White Convict Slave Convict
Voluntary
Manslaughter
Maiming
Kidnaping
Arson
Burglary
Robbery
Larceny
Not less than 2 years or
more than 7 years
Not less than 1 nor
more than 7 years
Not less than 3 nor
more than 21 years
Not less than 2 nor
more than 10 years
Not less than 3 nor
more than 7 years
Not less than 1 nor
more than 15 years
Not less than 1 nor
more than 5 years (Not
less than 5 nor more
than 15 years for horse
stealing)
Not more than 7 years
Not less than 7 years
Not less than 1 year
Not less than 1 year
and 3 hours in pillory
Not less then 6 months
and 39 lashes
Not less than 1 year; 50
lashes; and 2 hours in
pillory
39 lashes; 1 hour in
pillory
Offense
136. The table of punishments is derived by comparing the penalties for various offenses
set out in GOULD'S DIGEST ch. 51 (1848) with those set out for the same offenses in ARK. REV.
STAT. ch. 44 (1838).
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In addition, the General Assembly adopted a number of "police
regulations" governing the conduct of slaves. They subjected slaves to
criminal prosecution for such conduct as providing liquor to another slave,'
leaving the premises of their owner without a pass, 3 ' possessing a firearm
without the written permission of their owner,139 or participating in unlawful
assemblies or seditious speeches.1" Although most police regulations were
directed at slaves, several imposed criminal sanctions against white persons
who, without the consent of the owner, drank or gambled with slaves, 14'
permitted slaves to remain on their property more than four hours,' 42 or
permitted more than five slaves to gather on their property. 1
43
As in the case of slaves charged with capital offenses, the supreme court
treated slaves charged with noncapital offenses with a sensitivity to the
property interests of slave owners. One example of the court's tendency to
protect the property interest of the slave owner was its construction of an 1838
statute which provided:
In all trespasses and offences, less than felony, committed by any slave, on
the person or property of another person, the master may compound with
the injured person, and punish his own slave, without the intervention of
any legal trial or proceeding, and the compounding and satisfaction to the
person injured, shall be a bar to any further prosecution.'"
On its face the statute appears simply to have exempted the parties from any
legal prohibitions against giving or accepting compensation for not prosecuting
a criminal offense. 45 The language "may compound" suggested that neither
the master nor the injured party was obliged to compound. The Arkansas
Supreme court, however, interpreted the statute as imposing an affirmative duty
on the slave's victim to apply first to the slave's owner for punishment of the
slave and compensation for any injury. Only if the owner refused to compound
(i.e., to negotiate in good faith with the victim) was the victim free to seek
criminal prosecution of the slave. In Bone v. State'4 the court reversed the
conviction of a slave for assault and battery of a white woman because the
137. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 142, § 15 (1838).
138. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 142, § 21 (1838).
139. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 142, § 23 (1838).
140. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 142, § 24 (1838).
141. ARK, REv. STAT. ch. 142, § 25 (1838).
142. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 142, § 25 (1838).
143. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 142, § 26(1838).
144. Act of February 16, 1838 codified as ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 44, div. VIII, art. III, § 4
(1838).
145. ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 44, div. V, art. II, § 6 (1838) prohibited the taking of any money
or gratuity for abstaining from the prosecution of any felony.
146. 18 Ark. 109 (1856).
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indictment neglected to state and the evidence failed to show that the slave's
owner had refused to compound with the injured party.
The slave owner was the primary beneficiary of the court's determination
that compounding was a prerequisite to the successful criminal prosecution of
a slave for minor offenses. The court conceded this in Bone v. State when it
stated:
But, surely, it is reasonable provision of law, that the master should first be
applied to, and have an opportunity of punishing his slave, and compensat-
ing the injured party for the trespass, before he is subjected to the
inconvenience, loss of labor and costs of having the slave arrested, and
taken off to Court to go through the forms of a legal prosecution.'47
The injured party also profited from the compounding requirement. Although
forced to negotiate with the owner before seeking the criminal prosecution of
the slave, the victim did receive monetary compensation for the injury as well
as the emotional satisfaction of knowing that the slave would be punished by
the owner. The only real loser was the slave, who did not escape punishment
for his crime because part of the bargained for consideration between owner
and victim included the punishment to be inflicted on the slave. In fact, the
slave probably had less protection against arbitrary or cruel treatment when
punished by private agreement than when punished by the state.
Although the compounding statute did not apply when a slave was
charged with a felony, the court invited compounding in felony prosecutions.
As discussed above, Pleasant v. State'48 was the prosecution of a slave for the
attempted rape of a white woman. Because the attempted rape was a felony,
and a capital offense, the duty to compound did not apply. The defense offered
evidence showing that the victim and her husband had agreed not to prosecute
the slave if the slave's owner whipped the slave and paid the victim $125.'49
The supreme court ruled that the trial court erred by not requiring the victim to
answer whether she had offered to drop the prosecution in exchange for
money:
If answered in the affirmative, the jury might possibly have inferred, from
her own estimate of the injury alleged to have been committed, that it was
not worth the forfeit of a human life: or that the motive being mercenary,
her story may have been in whole, or in part, a fabrication. 5
147. Id. at 112-13.
148. 13 Ark. 360 (1853).
149. The victim initially wanted $200 for dropping the prosecution, but eventually settled
on $125 after the master claimed that he only paid $500 for the slave and could not afford to
pay $200 for his release. Apparently, the victim never received even the $125. Id. at 365.
150. Id. at 378.
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The effect of the ruling was to encourage the owner to compound with the
victim when his slave was accused of a felony. Even if the attempt to
compound was unsuccessful, the fact that negotiations occurred might be used
to impeach the testimony of the victim. '5
The supreme court balked at a more radical argument, the acceptance of
which would have extended the duty to compound to all noncapital offenses
by slaves. An 1848 act amended the penal code to define the term "felony" as
an offense punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary. This led
to some confusion regarding the scope of the duty to compound since slaves
were not subject to imprisonment in the penitentiary. The defendant in Mary
v. State152 was a slave charged with arson, and her counsel argued that the duty
to compound applied because arson by a slave was not punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary. The supreme court ruled, however, that
arson by a slave was a felony even though slaves were exempt from the
punishment used to classify offenses as felonies. 53 A decision to the contrary
would have broadened the duty to compound to include all offenses by slaves
other than those punishable by death.
One of the few situations in which the supreme court unequivocally
elected to treat a slave as a person rather than property was when a slave
asserted the "Nuremberg defense" to a criminal charge--i.e., she was only
following orders when she committed the crime. In Sarah v. State54 a slave
was charged with assault and battery on a white child. The trial court refused
to permit the slave's owner to testify that he ordered the slave to strike the
child. On appeal, the slave's attorney argued that by reason of the peculiar
relationship of slave to master, only the master was responsible for an offense
committed by the slave at the master's direction. 5 This defense must have
troubled the court. On one hand, the justices had announced in several
opinions that the institution of slavery was based on the absolute subordination
of slaves, 56 and they were probably reluctant to endorse a rule suggesting that
slaves should question the lawfulness of orders. On the other hand, a white
person who was assaulted by a slave or whose property had been stolen or
15 1. Accepting compensation to abstain from prosecuting a felony was a crime. ENGLISH'S
DIGEST ch. 51, pt. VII, art. HI, § 6 (1848). However, this did not concern the court in Pleasant
v. State, and there is no record at the appellate level of a slave owner or a victim being
prosecuted for attempting to compound a felony by a slave.
152. 24 Ark. 44 (1862).
153. Id. at 49.
154. 18 Ark. 114 (1856).
155. Id. at 116.
156. See, e.g., Austin v. State, 14 Ark. 555 (1854) discussed supra at note 70, and Brunson
v. Martin, 17 Ark. 270 (1856) discussed infra at note 164.
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burned by a slave would object to a rule that absolved from punishment the
slave who successfully pled obedience to orders. 57 In resolving the question,
the supreme court examined the common law rules applicable to the husband-
wife relationship versus that of master-servant. At that time, Arkansas
followed the common law rule that a woman who committed a wrongful act at
the command of her husband was not criminally liable for her act. 5 ' A servant
who committed a criminal offense at the direction of his master was liable to
both criminal prosecution and civil action. The court opted to apply the
master-servant rule with a ringing acknowledgment that the slave was a person:
The slave, however, is a human being-he is regarded as a rational
creature-a moral agent. He, as well as the master, is the subject of
government, and amenable to the laws of God and man. (citations omitted).
In all things lawful, the slave is absolutely bound to obey his master. But
a higher power than his master--the law of the land-forbids him to
commit crime. The mandate of the law extends to every rational subject
of the government. None are high enough to claim exemption from its
penal sanctions, and none too low to be reached by them. Where the
mandate of the law, and the command of the master come in conflict, the
obligation of the slave to obey the law is superior to his duty of obedience
to his master. 59
Sarah v. State was unusual because the court decided that treating a slave as a
human being was more important than ensuring her subservience to her owner.
157. Permitting the slave to escape prosecution did not leave the victim without a remedy
in the criminal courts. The owner of a slave who ordered his slave to commit a crime was also
guilty of the crime. Hubbard v. State, 10 Ark. 379 (1850) (upholding the slave owner's
conviction for removing timber from land reserved to schools based on evidence that his slave
cut several loads of wood from the land and unloaded the wood at the owner's house).
158. The common law rule was codified in ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 51, pt. I, § 8 (1848),
which provided:
Married women, acting under the threats, commands or coercion of their
husbands, shall not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor, if it appear from
all the facts and circumstances of the case, that violence, threats, commands or
coercion were used; and in such cases the husband shall be prosecuted as
principal, and receive the punishment which otherwise would have been inflicted
on the wife if she had been found guilty.
This statutory provision probably went further than the English common law, which did not
excuse a wife who committed treason, murder, or robbery at the coercion of her husband. See
Freel v. State, 21 Ark. 212 (1860) (homicide prosecution in which the court ruled that coercion
of the wife was not presumed from the mere presence of her husband at the commission of an
offense).
159. Sarah, 18 Ark. at 117. The court went on to conclude that a slave who committed a
crime at the direction of the master should not be punished as severely as for a voluntary crime.
It ordered that on retrial, testimony that the owner directed the slave to commit the assault and
battery should go to the jury in mitigation of the punishment of the slave. Id. at 118.
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This result contrasts with that reached in Austin v. State,' 6 where the court
refused to allow a provocation instruction in a homicide prosecution because
in that context subordinating a slave to his owner outweighed recognizing the
humanity of the slave. 16' The two cases are consistent insofar as the result in
each appeased the feelings of third parties-the family of the man killed by
Austin and the family of the child assaulted by Sarah. As was usually the case,
the recognition in Sarah v. State that a slave was a person did not ensure justice
for the slave. On the contrary, the holding of the case placed the obedient slave
who was ordered by her owner to commit a crime in an untenable position.
The slave could obey the owner and risk punishment by the state or disobey the
owner and risk punishment by the owner.
C. Slaves as Victims of Crimes
Slaves were undoubtedly the victims of crimes, but the appellate record
suggests that in Arkansas such crimes were seldom prosecuted.' 62 Not a single
case involving the prosecution of a white person for killing or injuring a slave
was appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court. By contrast the appellate
records in most other southern states reflect criminal prosecutions of whites for
crimes against slaves. 63
Brunson v. Martin'" sheds some light on the Arkansas Supreme Court's
attitude toward the homicide of a slave. An overseer sued to recover wages
from a plantation owner, who refused to pay because the overseer had shot and
killed one of the slaves assigned to his supervision. The overseer spent the
morning of the homicide drinking at a store near the plantation, where he
boasted that "he would make the negroes obey him, or he would kill them."'165
At about two or three in the afternoon the overseer approached a slave working
160. 14 Ark. 555 (1854). See supra note 70.
161. Austin, 14 Ark. at 567.
162. There are newspaper reports of white men being prosecuted for the murder of slaves.
ARK. GAZETTE, March 11, 1829, at 3 (reporting that a man in Chicot County prosecuted for
murder of his slave); ARK. GAZETTE, December 22, 1830, at 3 (reporting that a Little Rock man
held in jail for killing "a young and valuable" slave); ARK. GAZETTE, July 15, 1847, at 2
(reporting that a Johnson County man bound over on $5,000 bond for shooting his own slave).
163. The Louisiana Supreme Court heard several appeals of whites prosecuted for crimes
against slaves. See Judith K. Schafer, "Details of a Most Revolting Character": Cruelty to
Slaves as Seen in Appeals to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 68 CI.-KENT L. REv. 1283
(1993). Data gathered by Nash indicates that appellate courts in a number of other southern
States reviewed convictions of whites for injuries to slaves. See Nash, A More Equitable Past?
Southern Supreme Courts and the Protection of the Antebellum Negro, supra note 21, at 214
tbl. 1, 215, tbl. 11.
164. 17 Ark. 270 (1856).
165. Id. at 274.
1997] 439
UALR LAW JOURNAL
in the field aid with a whip in his hand told the slave that he had "come for his
shirt," indicating his intention to whip the slave. 166 The slave replied that "he
had pulled off his shirt to the last overseer."'167 The overseer drew a pistol and
told the slave that he "had come for his shirt, and intended to have it or hurt
him.' 68 Saying "shoot and be damned," the slave advanced on the overseer
with cotton in one hand and nothing in the other. 69 The overseer then shot the
slave three times, killing him. 70 The plantation owner promptly fired the
overseer, who then sued the owner for the value of his services rendered prior
to his discharge. The owner responded by seeking to recoup the damages he
sustained through loss of the slave. The case was submitted to a jury with an
instruction that the plantation owner was entitled to recoup the value of the
slave if the overseer "negligently and without necessity" killed the slave.'
7
'
The jury returned a verdict for the overseer, and the plantation owner appealed.
The supreme court affirmed the jury's verdict. It cited Austin v. State172
for the proposition that a slave owner, his representative, or even a complete
stranger had an absolute right to "overcome by proper means, graduated upon
principles of humanity and law, the slave's rebellion against the lawful
authority of his master.' 7' Although the court expressed some reservations
about the verdict, it ruled that the trial court's instruction essentially conveyed
this standard to the jury, and application of the standard to the particular facts
of the case was the function of the jury. The holding failed to protect the
property rights of the slave owner, but only because the court endorsed a
principle deemed more important to preserving the institution of slavery-the
right of any white person to overcome a slave's rebellion against lawful
authority.
The opinion in Brunson v. Martin provided no guidance as to the degree
of physical force that could be used to overcome a rebellious slave other than
it must be "graduated upon the principles of humanity and law," a phrase that
first appeared in Austin v. State. 74 According to the court: "To determine from
the evidence, whether the means used for overcoming the rebellion in this case,
were graduated upon the principles of humanity, was the appropriate province
of the jury....""r The Constitution of 1836 authorized the General Assembly
166. Id.
167. Id. at 274-75.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 275.
170. Id. at 275.
171. Id. at 272.
172. 114 Ark. 555 (1854). See supra note 70.
173. Brunson, 17 Ark. at 273.
174. See quoted material supra at note 86.
175. 17 Ark. at 273-74.
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to pass laws requiring the owners of slaves "to treat them with humanity,' ' 176
but the supreme court never delineated the point at which the disciplining of
a slave became a criminal offense. Other slaves states struggled with the same
issue, and most managed to develop statutory or common law limits on the
power to punish slaves. 77 The absence of standards in Arkansas made it
extremely difficult to prosecute a white person for using excessive physical
force against a slave and may explain why Arkansas was one of the few slave
states in which there is no appellate record of such prosecutions.
One civil case decided by the supreme court provides some indication of
what the court considered to be force that exceeded what was necessary to
discipline a slave. Pyeatt v. Spencer 78 was an action for breach of warranty in
connection with the sale of a female slave named Sophia. When Pyeatt sold
the slave to Spencer, he warranted that she was sound and healthy. The sale
separated Sophia from her children, to whom she was devoted, and she made
several attempts to run away to go to her children. Spencer sued Pyeatt alleging
that the slave was mentally deranged at the tiine of sale and that Pyatt was
aware of her condition. The jury found that the slave was unsound when sold
and awarded Spencer $716 in damages. According to the supreme court:
A few days after Spencer bought the slave, he was found whipping her. He
had her stripped, and staked down on the ground; her feet and hands
extended, and fastened to stakes; and her face downwards. He appeared
calm and deliberate, and was whipping her at intervals, using a cowhide,
with a plaited buckskin lash about fifteen inches long. He asked her what
made her [run away], and she said that Bedford and Buchanan told her, that
if she staid there, she would be whipped to death. The witness examined
the negro, and found her to look wild. Spencer had drawn some blood, but
not a great deal. He took salt and a cob, and salted her back. The witness
stated that he thought her deranged. He had never seen her before, but has
often seen her since, and she is deranged and valueless.'79
In a day when most opinions were lengthy and the court rarely overturned a
jury verdict, the court tersely reversed the judgment and awarded a new trial,
stating: "[i]t is with pain and sensibility, that the court feels itself constrained
to remark, that whatever seeming wildness and aberration of mind might be
perceived in the slave, it is but reasonable to suppose, was caused by grief, and
176. ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. VII, §1.
177. See, generally, MoRius, supra note 46, at 182-208. The inability of slaves to testify
against a white person presented evidentiary obstacles to the prosecution of an owner for
exceeding the standards. MORRIs, supra note 46, at 184.
178. 4 Ark. 563 (1842).
179. Id. at 563-64.
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the excessive cruelty of her owner."'' ° Unfortunately, the court's resolution of
the case offered no protection to the slave. Pyeatt failed to recover damages for
breach of the seller's warranty of soundness, but he retained possession of the
slave and was not subjected to criminal prosecution or any other penalty for
treating her in a manner sufficiently barbarous to outrage even the court.''
Ill. SLAVES IN CIVIL CASES
A. Civil Liability of Owner for Injuries Committed by Slaves
The dual character of a slave as both person and property was particularly
problematic for the court when it considered the question of an owner's civil
liability for the tortious acts of his slave. If the owner directed the slave to
injure the property or person of a third party, then clearly the owner should be
liable to the third party. But what if the acts that injured the third party were
not authorized by the owner or even contrary to the express orders of the
owner?
The court addressed that question in McConnell v. Hardeman, '2 which
was a civil action against a slave owner whose slave had taken the plaintiff's
horse. The court never seriously considered applying common law rules
imposing strict liability for injuries caused by cattle or vicious domestic
animals. 3 Having decided for purposes of the criminal law that a slave was
a person, capable of independent thought and action, the court could hardly
treat the slave as simply another type of property for civil liability purposes.
Besides, such a rule "would render it necessary to [the owner's] own
preservation from ruin, to keep [his slaves] up, as he does his beasts, to prevent
their going on the premises of another."' 8M
A second possibility open to the court was to apply the doctrine of
respondeat superior to the master-slave relationship. Even at this early point
in the development of tort law, the Arkansas court imposed liability on an
employer for the acts of employees within the scope of their employment. In
180. Id. at 570.
181. Additional descriptions of the methods used to discipline slaves can be found in
TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 203-208. See also William L. Van Deburg, The Slave Drivers of
Arkansas: A New View From the Narratives, 35 ARK. HIST. Q. 231 (1976), which discusses
slave discipline as described in oral histories collected in Arkansas from former slaves in the
1930's.
182. 15 Ark. 151 (1854).
183. Courts in most slave states likewise rejected the analogy. MORRIS, supra note 46, at
357-58.
184. McConnell, 15 Ark. at 155-56 (quoting Parham v. Blackwelder, 8 N.C. (8 Ired.) 446
(1848)).
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Duggins v. Watson,'85 which was a suit against the owners of a steamboat for
the negligent actions of the officers employed to operate the boat, the court
announced:
[T]he only safe rule of law is, that the master is liable for the tortious act
of his servant, engaged in his employment, though done willfully, without
orders, or even against orders. If the servant's disobedience of instruc-
tions, will exonerate the master, the proof, easily made, virtually does away
with the maxim of respondeat superior, designed for the protection of
innocent third persons, and obliging the principal to be careful in the
employment of agents, to whom he entrusts the means of committing an
injury 186
The court would later apply the master-servant analogy to hold a slave
criminally liable when she committed a crime at the direction of her master,'8 7
but in McConnell v. Hardeman it refused to apply the master-servant rule when
the issue was the civil liability of a slave owner for the tortious acts of a slave:
It is quite apparent that there is but little similarity in the relation of
master and slave, and that of master and servant, at the common law. The
slave is property, and though, for some purposes, treated as a person,
amenable to the law, and, at the same time, entitled to its protection for
offences committed by or against him, the dominion of the master is
absolute, except so far as it may be restrained or regulated by statute. The
duty of the slave is obedience .... Negro slavery... is not founded in any
contract between the master and the slave; and while the status or condition
of the slave continues, no valid contract can be made between them. If the
slave be injured by third persons, the redress by action is in the master, nor
can the slave become civilly liable for injuries done by him to the master
or to third persons.
On the other hand, at the common law, the servant, though a menial,
has civil, and may have political rights; his service begins, continues, and
terminates in contract with the employer. Though necessity may often be
a powerful incentive to obedience, he owes no duty beyond the obligation
of complying with his agreement for service .... The liability of the
master for the misconduct or negligence of the servant, while engaged in
his employment, implies a corresponding liability on the part of the servant
to the master for the consequences of his fault. The loss of service and
character may also be checks upon persons of this class, ensuring their
fidelity and good behavior.'88
185. 15Ark. 118(1854).
186. Id. at 127.
187. See Sarah v. State discussed supra at note 159.
188. McConnell, 15 Ark. at 152-53.
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Although it identified differences between the relationship of master-slave
and that of master-servant, the court never clearly articulated why these
differences made the doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable to master-
slave relationship. What the court appeared to be saying was that the
relationship between master and servant was founded on a contract, which
provided a basis for defining the scope of the servant's employment and hence
the liability of the master for the servant's acts. No contract existed to limit the
master's liability in the case of a slave. The master had absolute control over
a slave, and if the doctrine of respondeat superior were applied literally, all acts
of a slave would be within the scope of the master-slave relationship.'89
The court's reluctance to apply respondeat superior to the master-slave
relationship appears also to have been based on its belief that a servant was
easier to control than a slave. The passage quoted above discussed "incentives"
to a servant's obedience and "checks" that ensure a servant's fidelity and good
behavior. Later in the opinion the court referred to a South Carolina case in
which slaves were described as "in general a headstrong, a stubborn race of
people, who had a volition of their own, and the physical power of doing great
injury to neighbors and others, without the possibility of their masters having
any control over them, especially when absent from them ....
Having rejected respondeat superior as a basis for liability, the court could
have opted to treat the unauthorized acts of a slave as an intervening cause and
exonerate the owner completely from liability for such acts. This, according
to the court, was the rule followed in Tennessee.' 9' Absolving the owner of
civil liability for the acts of a slave probably comported most closely with the
pro-owner inclinations of the court, but such a ruling would have been
extremely unpopular with those Arkansans who do not own slaves.
189. The Arkansas court noted one South Carolina decision, Snee v. Trice, 2 S. C. L. (2
Bay) 345 (1802), in which the doctrine of respondeat superior was applied when the master
permitted the slave to provide services to the general public. Examples cited were a slave who
was permitted to work as a blacksmith or a ferryman. In these situations the slave's status is
the same as servant and the master's liability should correspond to his common law liability for
the acts of a servant. MORRIS, supra note 46, at 358.
190. McConnell, 15 Ark. at 154, (citing Snee v. Trice, 2 S.C. (2 Bay) 345 (1802)).
191. Id., (citing Wright v. Weatherby, 15 Tenn. (7 Yer.) 367 (1835)). Like its Arkansas
counterpart, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected both the vicious domestic animal analogy
and the master-servant analogy and declared that the common law did not provide a remedy for
the injuries resulting from the acts of a slave. See the discussion of Wright v. Weatherby in
Corre, supra note 18, at 1375-79 (1993). According to the Arkansas court, the Tennessee rule
was also followed "in a very doubtful and hesitating manner" by the Mississippi Supreme Court
in Leggett v. Simmons, 15 Miss. (7 S. & M.) 348 (1846).
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The court managed to emerge from the quagmire by cobbling a solution
that was unique to Arkansas."9 When the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed
the issue, it had the benefit of a statute which provided:
Masters of slaves in this State shall be held responsible for the full amount
of single damages and costs of the trespass of his slaves, and any person
injured by the tresspass (sic) of any slave, shall have his action against the
master for the damage he may have sustained by such slave.
93
Because the statute appeared in a part of the criminal code dealing with the
criminal prosecution of slaves, the court interpreted the statute as restricting the
owner's civil liability to trespasses by a slave that were indictable as criminal
offenses. This solution dovetailed nicely with the compounding statute
discussed above,"9 which the court cited as an additional indication that the
master was civilly liable for injuries resulting from the commission of criminal
trespasses by his slave. Although not articulated in the opinion, the court may
have felt more comfortable with the indictable offense limitation for another
reason. Throughout the opinion the court expressed concern about the
difficulty of controlling the tortious behavior of slaves. By limiting an owner's
liability to those trespasses of a slave that were indictable offenses, the court
carved out an area of limited owner liability in which the threat of criminal
prosecution might deter tortious conduct by a slave.
In the final analysis, the court in McConnell v. Hardeman was determin-
ing which of two parties--the slave owner or the injured person--should bear
the economic cost of a slave's tortious act. The justices were not completely
satisfied with the balance struck by their solution, which left the injured party
without legal redress when the slave's tortious act was not an indictable
trespass. The opinion closed with the court's suggestion that the legislature
consider changing the law:
In any future expression of the legislative will, it will be for that depart-
ment to consider, whether the true interests of slave-holders would not be
promoted by making them liable for all trespass committed by their slaves,
thus removing many causes ofjealously and ill-feeling against the owners
of that species of property, and at the same time protect them by limiting
their liability, as at the civil law, to the value of the offending slaves.'95
192. Missouri also limited recovery to injuries resulting from certain offenses but damages
could not exceed the value of the slave. MORRIs, supra note 46, at 365.
193. ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 51, pt. XII, Sec 3. (1848).
194. See supra text accompanying note 144.
195. McConnell, 15 Ark. at 158. According to Corre, the owner's liability under the civil
law was not limited to the value of the slave. The owner could elect either to surrender the
slave to the injured party in full satisfaction of any liability or to contest liability. If the owner
contested liability, the monetary value of the slave was not a cap on the damages that could be
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The General Assembly failed to follow the court's suggestion, and the
court continued to apply the indictable trespass limitation on an owner's civil
liability for the acts of a slave. The court held in Ridge v. Featherston'" that
a slave's owner was responsible for a horse killed by the slave since the wilful
and malicious killing of a horse was an indictable trespass. In Graham v.
RoarkP97 the rule was applied when the defendant's slaves cut down and carried
away the plaintiff's crops despite the defendant's attempt to escape liability on
the grounds that the overseer supervising the slaves had ordered the destruction
of the crops.
B. Civil Liability of Third Parties for Injuries to Slaves
In addition to considering the liability of an owner for injuries committed
by his slaves, the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the civil liability of third
parties for injuries to slaves. One of the features of slave law copied by
Arkansas from other states was the patrol system. The county court was
authorized to appoint a patrol within each township of the county consisting of
a captain and up to ten persons to visit all slave quarters and other places that
slaves might assemble within the area assigned to the patrol.' 9 If the patrol
found a slave at an unlawful assemblage or found a slave "strolling about from
one house or plantation to another, without a pass from his master, employer,
or overseer," it could administer up to twenty lashes to the slave.
99
In Hervey v. Armstrong2°° a patrol appointed by the Ouachita County
Court for Jefferson township had crossed into the neighboring township of
Marion. There the patrol came upon a group of slaves returning from a
religious gathering and, after determining that the slaves had no pass,
proceeded to whip the slaves. The owner of the slaves filed a civil action
against the members of the patrol, and a jury returned a verdict in favor of the
owner.
20 1
On appeal the supreme court upheld instructions of the trial court to the
effect that a patrol's jurisdiction was limited to the township for which it was
assessed against the owner. Corre, supra note 18, at n. 15.
196. 15 Ark. 159 (1854).
197. 23 Ark. 19 (1861).
198. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 109, §§ I et. seq. (1838).
199. Id. ch. 109, § 5 (1838). A white person caught in the company of slaves at night "in
suspicious places" could also receive up to twenty lashes, but only if first convicted by the
circuit court. Id. at § 6.
200. 15 Ark. 162 (1854).
201. Id. at 163. The report of the case does not indicate the amount of damages awarded
to the owner.
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appointed. This meant that the defendants could not rely on the patrol statute
202
as justification for any injuries inflicted on the slaves.
The supreme court had more difficulty with the trial court's refusal to give
an instruction requiring the slave owner to show special damages in order to
recover damages. The requested instruction raised the question whether a slave
was a person or only property. The supreme court conceded that under the
criminal code a slave was considered "a person capable of committing a crime,
and against whom offences may be committed," 203 but the court refused to treat
the slave as a person for purposes of a civil action to recover damages. The
only civil injury recognized by the law was to the property of the owner, for
which the owner could recover only if he showed special damages, such as
medical expenses or loss of service of the slave: "[f]or the breach of the peace,
the offender may be punished by a public prosecution, which the master can set
on foot. But for the cruel injury, treating slaves as property, the master can
only recover damages upon the ground of compensation.
' 204
The court's justification for limiting the right of recovery to cases in
which the owner suffered economic injury demonstrated once again the
importance it attached to white racial dominance:
We apprehend the reason why the master cannot have a civil action for the
battery of his slave without special damage, is, that it would encourage
slaves, of their own propensity, or by the sufferance of their masters, to be
insolent by word or demeanor. The elevation of the white race, and the
happiness of the slave, vitally depend upon maintaining the ascendancy of
one and the submission of the other. The rights of individuals must yield
to the necessity of preserving the distinction between races.
25
In short, allowing a civil right of action for the personal injury of a slave might
discourage third parties from using physical force to keep slaves in their place.
The right to recover had to be carefully limited to cases in which the property
rights of the slave's owner were harmed. The ruling is entirely consistent with
the court's opinion in Austin v. State,206 where it held that assault of a slave by
a white person did not constitute provocation, and its opinion in Brunson v.
Martin,27 where it refused to find that an overseer used excessive force when
he killed a slave who refused to submit to a whipping.
202. Id. at 164.
203. Id. at 166.
204. Id. at 167 (Citations omitted).
205. Id. at 168-69.
206. 14 Ark. 555 (1854). See supra text accompanying note 85.
207. 17 Ark. 270 (1856). See supra text accompanying note 173.
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IV. EMANCIPATION OF SLAVES
The Constitution of 1836 specifically prohibited the freeing of slaves
without the consent of their owners, but the document did authorize the
legislature to pass laws permitting voluntary emancipation of slaves by their
owners so long as the rights of creditors were protected and the slaves did not
become a public charge.208 On February 19, 1838, the General Assembly
enacted legislation that allowed an owner to emancipate a slave by will or by
any other written instrument attested by two persons and proved in the circuit
court.2' Freed slaves remained subject to the claims of the owner's creditors
to satisfy any debt contracted by the owner prior to the emancipation.2 0
Moreover, the former owner was liable for the support and maintenance of a
freed slave who was not of sound mind, who was over the age of forty-five,
who was under the age of twenty-one in the case of males, or who was under
the age of eighteen in the case of females.2
The same session of the legislature also established a detailed procedure
for determining whether a person was entitled to freedom. 212  The act
authorized a person held in slavery to petition the circuit court for leave to sue
as an indigent "to establish his right to freedom., 213 If the court determined that
the petition contained sufficient information to authorize the commencement
of a suit, it issued an order allowing the person to sue as an indigent, granting
the person sufficient liberty to consult with counsel, and preventing the
person's removal from the jurisdiction of the court or punishment for filing the
petition.214
An emancipation petition was characterized by the statute as a suit for
false imprisonment.25 By treating the action as one for false imprisonment the
legislature ensured that a jury resolved factual disputes in suits for freedom.
This was probably thought at the time to be a constitutional requirement. The
Arkansas Supreme Court later denied slaves the right to seek liberty by habeas
corpus because the absence of a jury trial in a habeas hearing meant that the
owner of a slave might be deprived of property without the due process
208. ARK. CONST. of 1836 art. VII, § 1. The prohibition on legislative emancipation of
slaves was a controversial issue when the proposed constitution was submitted to Congress.
TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 44.
209. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 56, § 1 (1838).
210. Id. § 3.
211. Id. §4.
212. Act of December 18, 1837, codified as ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 66 (1838).
213. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 66, § 1 (1838).
214. Id. § 2.
215. Id. § 9.
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guaranteed by the constitution.1 6 In any event, the supreme court usually
insisted that a suit in circuit court for false imprisonment was the exclusive
procedure for determining a slave's claim to freedom. In addition to denying
relief via a writ of habeas corpus, the court ruled that a probate court had no
jurisdiction to declare a slave free, even when the claim to freedom was
predicated on a will being probated in the court.217
Although numerous emancipation suits were appealed to the Arkansas
Supreme Court, it is difficult to discern from the court's disposition of the
appeals a consistent resolution of the person versus property question. Based
on the cases discussed above, one would expect the court to be hostile to
attempts by slaves to gain their freedom, but this was not necessarily the case.
It may be that the justices had mixed feelings about emancipation suits because
the property interest of slave owners as a group was not always clear. A ruling
in favor of emancipation cut off the property interest of the particular person
who claimed to be the owner of a slave, but the property interest of a slave
owner included the right to set the slave free, and any curtailment of that right
infringed on the property rights of slave owners in general.
A complicating factor that influenced the court's resolution of emancipa-
tion cases was the changing public attitude toward emancipation. According
to Taylor, "[t]hat attitude ranged from bare tolerance at the time of achievement
of statehood in 1836 to bitter animosity by 1858. ' 21s The resistance to
emancipation was motivated in part by concerns of skilled white laborers who
feared competition from freed slaves, 219 but most of the opposition to liberating
slaves came from slave owners, who believed that the presence of free blacks
in the state provoked unrest and discontent among blacks who were not free.220
The 1837 session of the General Assembly also approved detailed
legislation designed to discourage the immigration into Arkansas of freed
slaves from other states.22' Free persons with at least one black grandparent
immigrating to Arkansas from another state were required to file with the clerk
of the county court in the county in which they wished to settle both a
certificate evidencing their freedom and a five hundred dollar bond for good
216. Daniel v. Guy, 19 Ark. 121, 132 (1857).
217. See Aramynta v. Woodruff, 7 Ark. 422 (1847) (reversing a decree of a probate court
setting slaves free). In Phebe v. Quillin, 21 Ark. 490 (1860), the court declined to rule out
completely the possibility of equitable relief through a suit in chancery court but indicated that
in most cases the plaintiff should pursue the statutory remedy in circuit court.
218. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 244.
219. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 111. In the fall of 1858, white mechanics and artisans in
Little Rock held several public meetings to protest the use of slaves and free blacks in skilled
jobs. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 111.
220. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 250.
221. ARK. REv. STAT. ch. 103 (1838).
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behavior and for the payment of their support in the event they were unable to
support themselves. Those who failed to register could be taken before a
justice of the peace and required to prove their free status. Persons who could
not show they were free were dealt with as runaway slaves. Persons who were
able to show they were free could still be fined, whipped, and deported from
the state for failure to file the five hundred dollar bond. Exceptions were
provided for freed slaves employed on steamboats, as wagon drivers or
messengers, or as servants to travelers.
In 1843 the General Assembly barred the further immigration of freed
slaves into the state.2 2 Free persons of African descent living in the state prior
to that date were allowed to remain, but were required to file with the clerk of
the county court a bond of five hundred dollars to assure their good behavior
and support.223 John Pendleton, a free black living in Crawford County,
challenged the statute on the grounds that it violated his constitutional rights
as a citizen of the United States and the state of Arkansas. Ten years before the
United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in the Dred Scott
case,' the Arkansas Supreme Court summarily disposed of Pendleton's case
by holding that only white persons were citizens entitled to the protection of
the United States and the Arkansas Constitutions.'
Opposition to the emancipation of slaves continued to grow throughout
the 1840's and 1850's. In 1859 the General Assembly at last bowed to public
pressure and approved legislation that banned any further emancipation of
slaves 226 and required all free blacks to leave the state by January 1, 1860, or
be sold into slavery at public auction."2 The Constitution of 1861, adopted
when Arkansas seceded from the Union, declared that the legislature had no
power to pass laws for the emancipation of slaves. 228 The fact that these bans
came so close in time to the emancipation of all slaves in Arkansas makes it
222. ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 75, § 2 (1848). The immigration bar took effect on
March 1, 1843.
223. ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 75, § 10 (1848).
224. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
225. Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509 (1846).
226. Act 68 of 1859 Ark. Acts, approved February 2, 1859.
227. Act 151 of 1859 Ark. Acts, approved February 12, 1859. The legislature later
suspended the effective date of the expulsion to January 1, 1863 for those "held in duress, or
by operations of law." Act 99 of 1860 Ark. Acts, approved Jan. 10, 1861. No other state took
the extreme step of expelling all free blacks. Paul Finkelman, "Let Justice Be Done, Though
the Heavens May Fall": The Law of Freedom, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 325, 333 (1994).
228. ARK. CONST. of 1861, art. VII, § 3. The Constitution of 1861 also limited most basic
procedural rights in criminal cases to "free white men and Indians." See ARK. CONST. of 1861,
art. II, § 6 (right to trial by impartial jury), § 10 (right to due process of law), § 14 (right to
indictment), and § 16 (right to bail).
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difficult to assess their impact on the voluntary emancipation of slaves by their
owners.
Against this changing political backdrop the supreme court considered
appeals in several emancipation suits. The cases fall into two general
categories. In the first category are those cases in which the petitioner had
clearly once been a slave. The question before the court was whether the
owner had legally freed the petitioner. A second category of cases consists of
cases in which the petitioner claimed to be a white person who could not
legally be held as a slave.
A. Statutory Emancipation
Several emancipation verdicts in the first group were reversed because the
court regarded the power to emancipate slaves as derived solely from the 1838
statute and therefore demanded strict compliance with the mode of emancipa-
tion set out in that statute-i.e., a slave could be freed only by will or by
written instrument attested by two witnesses and proved in the circuit court.
An example of the court's insistence that emancipation conform to statutory
formalities was its decision in Jackson v. Bob." 9 George Brown emigrated to
Arkansas from Virginia in 1835, bringing with him a teenaged slave named
Bob. Brown sold Bob to Robert Hamilton in exchange for $600 in goods.
Hamilton agreed in writing that at the end of six years, Bob was to be appraised
and then freed after he had worked out the value at which he was appraised.
Unfortunately, Hamilton died without freeing Bob, and the slave was sold
under execution as the property of Hamilton.230 Bob brought a circuit court
action for his freedom against his current owner, Jackson. The case was
submitted to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of Bob, and the circuit
court entered judgment ordering his liberation.
Jackson appealed and the supreme court reversed the judgment. The court
conceded that Hamilton had a contractual obligation to set Bob free, but the
suit for freedom failed because Hamilton failed to execute a will or other
properly attested written document effectuating the emancipation. The court
analogized the institution of slavery to that of marriage. Each relationship was
a legal "status" in which not only the parties but the entire community had an
interest. To end either the owner-slave or the husband-wife relationship, the
parties had to comply strictly with the mode of termination prescribed by law.
229. 18 Ark. 399 (1857).
230. It is unclear whether the sale occurred before or after the death of Hamilton. See id.
at 412.
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The plaintiff argued that the circuit court had the power to order the
execution of any instrument necessary for his emancipation, but the supreme
court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, there was no one whom the
court could order to execute such an instrument. According to the court,
Jackson, the current owner, was under no contractual obligation to emancipate
Bob; Hamilton, the former owner, was dead; and the executor of Hamilton's
estate was not a party to the proceeding. The court's explanation ignored the
fact that Bob was not a slave for life. Hamilton's interest in Bob was limited
by his contract with Brown, and Hamilton could not convey more than his
interest. A deed conveying a slave typically included a warranty that the slave
was a slave for life. If Bob was not a slave for life, then the purchaser's
remedy was to sue the seller for breach of this warranty."'
The court said that a second obstacle to ordering the execution of an
emancipation instrument was that Hamilton's obligation to set Bob free was to
Brown, not to Bob. The court stated that even if Bob had been a party to the
emancipation agreement, he could not compel specific performance of
Hamilton's promise because the consideration for Hamilton's promise--i.e.,
the labor of the slave--was furnished by Brown, not by Bob. The only person
with standing to enforce the contract was apparently Brown, the owner who
originally entered the contract, but the court deemed it unnecessary to decide
whether Brown, who was not a party to the action, had any remedy against the
representatives of Hamilton for breach of contract.
Since Jackson v. Bob was the only case in which the Arkansas Supreme
Court considered a contract to liberate a slave at a future date, the scope of the
ruling is unclear. The case can be interpreted narrowly as denying a slave any
rights to enforce, as a third party beneficiary, a contract between two white
persons. However, the reasoning of the court, particularly its conclusion that
the owner, not the slave, furnished the consideration for the contract, indicates
that it would also have refused to enforce a contract between a slave and his
owner for the liberation of the slave. To induce faithful service owners
sometimes promised slaves their freedom at a future date. There are reported
cases from Tennessee, Kentucky, and Louisiana enforcing such agreements,232
231. Compare Strayhom v. Giles, 22 Ark. 517 (1861). There the seller's agent executed
a bill of sale warranting that a particular slave was a slave for life despite the agent's knowledge
of rumors that the slave was free. When the slave subsequently obtained a judgment of
liberation, the purchaser successfully brought an action against the agent for fraud. The court
stated in dictum that if the agent had advised the purchaser of the emancipation rumors, the
purchaser's sole remedy would have been to sue the seller for breach of warranty.
232. Morris discusses cases in these states recognizing the right of a slave to make and
enforce a contract for his own freedom. MORRIS, supra note 46, at 380-85. Compare Anthony
R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN.
L. REv. 1, 29-32 (1995).
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but Jackson v. Bob indicates that the Arkansas Supreme Court considered such
agreements unenforceable because the consideration promised by the slave
already belonged to the owner. The Arkansas court would have presumably
reached the same result if the owner agreed to free a slave upon payment by the
slave of a specified sum. Since any property of the slave belonged to the
owner, the consideration for the agreement was money that was already the
property of the owner.233 The rigidity exhibited by the court in Jackson v. Bob
reflects the court's one dimensional view of slaves as property rather than
persons.234
In Harriet v. Swan & Dixon,235 the owners' failure to comply wiih the
statutory formalities of emancipation similarly thwarted the attempts of a
woman and her children to gain their freedom. Gilbert Barden, the original
owner of the family, had executed a written instrument granting the family
freedom after the death of his wife, Charlotte Barden, provided the family
"continue faithfully and obediently to serve my said wife.., as dutiful slaves
to her during her life... ,,236 By separate deed Gilbert Barden also gave the
family 29 acres of land when they obtained their freedom. Gilbert Barden died,
and his widow, Charlotte Barden, was appointed administrator of his estate.
She filed an inventory with the probate court that included the slaves and paid
some claims against the estate, but she never sought to set apart her dower
interest in the estate or to distribute the assets of the estate. When Charlotte
Barden died, she left a will providing for the immediate emancipation of the
two adult members of the slave family. The children were to be hired out until
each reached the age of twenty-one at which time he or she was to be set free
and was to receive half the proceeds of the hiring out.237
The heirs and distributees of the estate of Gilbert Barden brought suit in
chancery court to recover from the estate of Charlotte Barden all property,
including the slaves, that came into the widow's hands as administrator of the
233. The inability of a slave to enter a contract with his owner did not appear to discourage
another common arrangement between owners and their slaves. Slaves who were skilled
artisans often entered into informal contracts with their owners. The slaves were granted
considerable "freedom" to find employment in their particular craft. In return, the slaves agreed
to provide their own housing, food, and clothing and pay a fixed sum from their earnings to
their owners. For a general description of this arrangement as it evolved in Little Rock, see
Paul D. Lack, An Urban Slave Community: Little Rock 1831-1862, 61 ARK. HIST. Q. 258
(1982). The practice probably violated a police regulation that imposed a fine on an owner who
permitted his slave "to go at large, upon a hiring of his own time, or to act or deal as a free
person." ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 153, § 34 (1848).
234. Compare the quote set out supra in text accompanying note 188, where the court again
stated that no valid contract could be made between an owner and a slave.
235. 18 Ark. 495 (1857).
236. Id. at 499.
237. The other half of the proceeds of the hire went to the Methodist Church.
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estate of Gilbert Barden. The slaves were allowed to interplead and assert their
right to freedom under the instruments executed by the two Bardens. The
chancery court ruled against the claim for freedom, and the family appealed.
The supreme court affirmed the chancellor's decision. It ruled that the
family was not entitled to freedom based on the instrument executed by Gilbert
Barden, because it was not attested and proved in circuit court at the time of its
execution as required by the emancipation statute. Citing its decision during
the same term in Jackson v. Bob, the court insisted "that where the law
prescribes a certain form and manner for manumission, no other manner or
mode can be adopted or pursued by which it can be lawfully effected."23
In the alternative, the family argued that Charlotte Barden had acquired
title to them by adverse possession and that they were entitled to freedom under
her will. Although the record is ambiguous, the family was apparently in the
possession of Mrs. Barden for at least twelve years following the death of her
husband.239 The statute of limitations on an action to recover possession of a
slave was five years.240 The supreme court rejected this argument on the
grounds that Charlotte Barden was in possession of the slaves either as
administrator of the estate of her husband or as a tenant in common with the
heirs of her husband. In neither capacity would her possession be adverse to
that of the heirs, and consequently the statute of limitations did not run against
the heirs.
A third emancipation action addressing the validity of a written instrument
of emancipation demonstrates that the court was prepared to liberate a slave
provided the owner complied with the formalities prescribed by statute. In Bob
v. Powers241 a slave brought an action for freedom in the Yell County Circuit
Court against the administrator of the estate of his former owner. While still
alive the owner had executed an instrument, which was properly acknowledged
by two witnesses and proved by the owner before the Yell County Circuit
Court, granting freedom to nine slaves, including the plaintiff, after the owner's
death. The trial court refused to permit the slaves to introduce the emancipa-
tion deed on the theory that the deed took effect on the owner's death rather
than immediately. This, according to the trial court, rendered the deed
testamentary in character, and it could not be introduced into evidence in circuit
court as a testamentary emancipation unless it was first probated in probate
238. Harriet, 18 Ark. at 503.
239. Gilbert Barden apparently died some time prior to June 19, 1839. Id. at 501.
Charlotte Barden died in July of 1851. Id. at 504.
240. ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 153, § 3 (1848), discussed in Crabtree v. McDaniel, 17 Ark.
222 (1856).
241. 19 Ark. 424 (1858).
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court. Without the deed the jury probably had little choice but to return a
verdict against the slaves.
On appeal, the supreme court ruled that the trial court erred in excluding
the deed. The deed in question was properly attested by two witnesses and
proved in the circuit court as required by the emancipation statute. The court
rejected the administrator's assertion that the deed was testamentary in
character by analogizing it to a deed that conveyed a slave to a third party
while reserving a life estate to the grantor. Such a deed, if delivered to the
grantee, passed a present title to the grantee and was not considered testamen-
tary in character.242
The plaintiff also introduced at trial the will of his former owner in which
the owner reiterated his intent that the plaintiff be set free at his death. The
administrator of the estate argued that a testamentary emancipation was not
effective until the administrator consented or until two years had passed from
the date he was appointed administrator 43 He also argued that no testamentary
emancipation was effective until the running of the time within which the
widow of the owner could assert her dower interest in the slaves.2' The
supreme court ruled that under the deed executed by the owner during his life,
the slaves became free immediately on the death of the owner, and that no
interest in the slaves passed to the administrator, the widow, or the creditors of
the estate. The court did acknowledge that the plaintiff's right to freedom was
subordinate to the creditors of the owner at the time of emancipation.245 The
right of these creditors to payment was to be satisfied, however, not by selling
the slaves but by hiring out the slaves until sufficient funds were raised to pay
their claims.
So long as the owner complied with the statutory formalities for
emancipation, the court continued to uphold the right of owners to free their
slaves, even in the face of mounting public opposition to the practice. As
discussed above, in 1843 the General Assembly enacted a statute barring the
immigration of freed slaves into the state after March 1, 1843. The court
242. The court was following the prevailing view in recognizing that a deed of
emancipation could become effective at a future date. The more difficult question posed by in
futuro manumissions was the status of children born to a female slave between the date of the
emancipation deed and the date it became effective. See cases discussed in MORRIS, supra note
46, at 404-12. This issue never arose in an Arkansas Supreme Court case.
243. The administrator could not be required to pay distributive shares until two years after
receiving his letters of administration. ENGLSH'S DIGEST ch. 4, § 131 (1848).
244. A widow who elected to take dower in lieu of the provisions of her husband's will had
to make such an election within one year from her husband's death. ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 59,
§ 14 (1848).
245. The court presumably meant creditors at the time the deed was executed. Persons who
became creditors after that date were placed on notice when the owner proved the deed before
the circuit court.
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considered the effect of the 1843 legislation on the ability of Arkansas slave
owners to emancipate their slaves in Campbell v. Campbell.246 The case
involved the probate of the estate of a slave owner named Duncan Campbell,
who when he died was survived by a three year old daughter named Viney
whose mother was one of his slaves. In his will Duncan Campbell gave his
daughter the sum of five thousand dollars and directed his sister "to take charge
of the above named Viney, and take care of her until she arrives to the age of
fifteen years, when she is to be free and receive her legacy." 7 After qualifying
as executor of the will, the testator's brother, Samuel Campbell, took Viney to
Missouri and sold her as a slave. On learning of the sale, the chancellor before
whom the probate was pending ordered the executor to produce the child, and
when the executor failed to do so, the chancellor imprisoned him for contempt
and appointed a guardian to find and reclaim the child. The guardian
eventually found the child in Missouri and was able to recover her by filing a
writ of habeas corpus in that state. Once the child was safely back in Arkansas,
a court battle ensued between the siblings of Duncan Campbell over the status
of Viney and the disposition of their late brother's estate.
By this stage of the proceedings it was clear to all parties that after paying
debts of Duncan Campbell, his estate would be less than the five thousand
dollars he gave to Viney. One group of siblings, led by Samuel Campbell,
argued that by prohibiting the immigration of free slaves into the state, the
General Assembly impliedly repealed all statutory authority for the emancipa-
tion of slaves: "If free negroes are not suffered to settle in Arkansas, it would
seem to follow, as a necessary consequence, that they could not be emanci-
pated." If Viney was still a slave, then she was incapable of inheriting from
her father, and the property of Duncan Campbell passed to his brothers and
sisters. A second group of siblings, led by Cornelius Campbell, insisted that
Duncan Campbell had often expressed his intention to set the child free when
he died. They supported the daughter's claim to her freedom as well as her
claim to Duncan Campbell's estate.
In a resolution worthy of a novel by Charles Dickens, the circuit court of
Chicot County decreed that the child was free and was entitled to the $5,000
legacy left her by her father. The court also appointed Cornelius Campbell as
the child's guardian.
The losing heirs appealed, but the supreme court affirmed the circuit
court's decision. It ruled that despite some ambiguity in the language of the
will, it was clear that Duncan Campbell intended that Viney be freed at his
246. 13 Ark. 513 (1853).
247. Id. at 513.
248. Id. at 514.
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death, not at age fifteen. The court also rejected the argument that the 1838
statute authorizing emancipation by will or by deed had been impliedly
repealed by the 1843 statute prohibiting the immigration of free blacks to the
state. Apparently, statutes in some other southern states allowed emancipation
only on condition that the liberated slave immediately leave the state. The
effect of such statutes was to "impose on other States the burden of an
unfortunate class of population."2 49 The court characterized the 1843 Arkansas
statute prohibiting the immigration of freed slaves into the state as a "measure
of self-defense," designed to protect Arkansas from slaves freed in other states,
but it found no similar legislative intent to prohibit the freeing of Arkansas
slaves, noting, "[W]e will tolerate the evils resulting from the emancipation of
our own slaves, until such time as the sense of the people may require an
avowed change of policy." 2s That time came in 1859, some six years after the
court's decision in Campbell v. Campbell, when the General Assembly finally
banned the voluntary emancipation of slaves. 25'
The 1859 ban on voluntary emancipation of slaves produced Phebe v.
Quillin, 2 the court's final opinion addressing compliance with the formalities
of emancipation. Joshua Averett died in 1853 leaving a will providing that all
of his slaves were to be freed seven years after his death and that until such date
the testator's nephew was to have charge of the slaves and receive the revenue
they produced. In 1857 one of the slaves, along with eighteen of her children
and grandchildren, filed suit in chancery court against the nephew and two
other men to whom he had purported to sell several of the plaintiffs "with a
view of appropriating them as slaves for life." The chancery court dismissed
the action, and the plaintiffs appealed.
The supreme court wasted little time with the defendant's argument that
emancipation was barred by the 1859 act; it ruled that the act did not apply
retroactively to instruments of emancipation executed prior to its passage. It
did, however, conclude that the chancellor correctly dismissed the action
because the suit was premature. The plaintiffs were to be free seven years from
the 1853 death of their former owner, and until the seven years expired, they
had no right on which to base a suit. The opinion was an improvement on
Jackson v. Bob,2s3 at least to the extent it recognized that a slave who was
emancipated at a future date had a judicial remedy when that date arrived.
Although the justices in Phebe v. Quillin again rejected attempts to restrict
the right of slave owners to set slaves free, the opinion reveals that they were
249. Id. at 521.
250. Id. at 522.
251. Act 68 of 1859 Ark. Acts.
252. 21 Ark. 490 (1860).
253. See supra text accompanying note 229.
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clearly aware of the changing public sentiment toward emancipation. The
court felt obliged to end its opinion with an editorial comment explaining its
attitude toward suits for freedom:
Much has been said, by the counsel for the respective parties, upon
the liberality and strictness with which suits for freedom should be treated
by courts.
In the earlier cases, the general rule of the courts, in States that are
now slave States, seemed to be and was often so announced from the
bench, that the courts would lean towards the grant of freedom, while, in
the latter decisions, there would seem to be reason to fear that the great
reaction in public sentiment, in the southern States, relative to the
emancipation of slaves, may produce a habit of construction so stringent
as to endanger the even balance which should ever be extended to the rich
and the poor, the white and the black, the free and the bond.
The question of freedom should be determined, like every other
question made before the courts, solely upon its legal aspects, without
partiality to an applicant for freedom, because he may be defenseless, and
a member of an inferior race, and certainly without prejudice to his kind
and color, and without regard to the sincere convictions that all candid,
observing men must entertain, that a change from the condition of
servitude and protection, to that of being free negroes, is injurious to the
community, and more unfortunate to the emancipated negro than to any
one else.M
B. Emancipation Based on Race
In a second group of emancipation cases decided by the court, compliance
with the formalities of the emancipation statute was not the issue. Instead, the
plaintiffs sought their freedom on the grounds that they were members of the
white race and could not be held as slaves. Because cases in this second group
did not involve the right of slave owners to set slaves free, they provide a much
better test of the court's stance on the person versus property issue in
emancipation cases.
The second group of cases raised a question that lay at the very heart of
the institution of slavery. If the legal and moral justification for slavery was the
"striking difference between the black and white man, in intellect, feelings and
principles,"2" the court had to develop a racial definition that classified the
significant percentage of the population of Arkansas with both black and white
254. Phebe, 21 Ark. at 500.
255. The court's entire quote is set out supra in text accompanying note 32.
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ancestors. 6 Moreover, application of that racial definition in a particular case
was usually a jury question. When freedom turned on the factual question of
the plaintiff's race rather than the owner's compliance with the legal require-
ments of the emancipation statute, the supreme court was forced to defer to the
findings of the jury. Slaves who sued to gain their freedom on racial grounds
often found jurors more sympathetic than the high court, which suggests that
jurors in emancipation suits may have been more likely than the justices to
identify with slaves as fellow human beings than as chattels, particularly when
the person claiming freedom appeared to the jurors to be "white."
The leading emancipation case involving race was Daniel v. Guy,2 7 which
was a suit for false imprisonment by Abby Guy and her four minor children
against Daniel, who claimed they were his slaves. Guy presented testimony
that she and her children had lived as free persons for some eight or nine years
in Ashley County. The oldest child boarded out and attended school, and the
family went to a white church and socialized with white persons. Daniel
countered with testimony that Guy was the daughter of a slave named Polly
formerly owned by Daniel's father, that Polly had passed to Daniel's sister on
the death of the father, and that Daniel had purchased Guy from his sister. Two
physicians testified for Guy as "experts" on the physical characteristics that
distinguish one race from another. The Ashley County jury returned a verdict
in favor of the Guy family, and the circuit court ordered them liberated.
Daniel appealed, citing as error several of the circuit court's instructions
to the jury. The circuit court appeared to have proceeded with impeccable
logic in crafting its instructions. Arkansas law defined a "mulatto" as "every
person, not a full negro, who shall be one-fourth or more negro."' 8 The statute
regulating suits for emancipation provided, "If the plaintiff be a negro or
mulatto, he is required to prove his freedom., 259 Based on this authority the
circuit court instructed the jury that if "the plaintiffs were less than one-fourth
negro, they were presumed to be free, and the burden of proving them to be
slaves was upon the defendant." 2" After reviewing numerous Arkansas
statutes using the term "mulatto," the supreme court concluded, however, that
the General Assembly used the term to refer to any person with a black
ancestor "without regard to grades." ' From this conclusion the supreme court
256. In the 1850 census, 67% of free blacks were of mixed blood compared to 16% of
slaves. By the 1860 census, 61% of free blacks and 13% of slaves were classified as having
mixed ancestry. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 240.
257. 9 Ark. 121 (1857).
258. ENGLISH'S DIGEST ch. 75, § 1 (1848).
259. Id. ch. 74, § 12 (1848).
260. Daniel, 19 Ark. at 130.
261. Id. at 134.
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announced the following rules of evidence applicable to emancipation suits in
Arkansas:
1. When a person held as a slave, sues for freedom, and it manifestly
appears that he belongs to the negro race, whether of full or mixed blood,
he is presumed to be a slave, that being the condition generally of such
people in this State.
2. If it appear that he belongs to the white race, he is presumed free.
3. If it be doubtful, whether he belong to the white or the negro race, there
is no basis for legal presumption, one way or the other, but it is safest to
give him the benefit of the doubt, as the courts should be careful that a
person of the white race be not deprived of his liberty."2
Because the circuit court's instructions were contrary to these evidentiary rules,
the supreme court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.
By treating a person with a single African ancestor as black, the Arkansas
Supreme Court went further than any other southern State at the time. Daniel
v. Guy was the only example prior to 1865 of the "one drop" rule of racial
definition that became the norm in many southern States after the Civil War.263
Most other southern States required a person to be at least one-fourth African
in order to raise the presumption that the person was a slave. The evidentiary
rules announced by the court in Daniel v. Guy were probably mitigated
somewhat by the difficulty of proving that a person had African ancestors. A
person was presumed to be a slave if it "manifestly" appeared that he was of
African descent. Although the party opposing freedom could offer testimony
about the ancestry of a person claiming to be free, the jurors were the final
arbiters of the person's race. When the evidence was conflicting, the jurors
probably based their verdict on their own conclusions regarding a person's
race.
This point was demonstrated by what happened on remand in Daniel v.
Guy. The owner, perhaps fearing that Guy's neighbors believed her and her
family to be white, was granted a change of venue to Drew County. This failed
to help the owner's case because after receiving instructions substantially in
accord with the rules of evidence announced in the first appeal, a Drew County
262. Id. The presumption that a black person was a slave apparently applied only in
emancipation cases. In State v. Alford, 22 Ark. 386 (1860), the jury convicted the defendant
of second degree murder and imposed a punishment of imprisonment in the penitentiary for
eighteen years. The state appealed the verdict on the grounds that the defendant was a slave and
that slaves convicted of murder could only be sentenced to death. The indictment alleged that
the defendant was black, but no evidence was offered at trial to show he was a slave. The
supreme court rejected the state's contention that the defendant was presumed to be a slave
because of his race and affirmed the sentence to imprisonment.
263. MORRIS, supra note 46, at 27.
264. MORRIs, supra note 46, at 27.
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jury also returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. The owner again appealed to the
supreme court.265 This time he contended that the circuit court erred when it
permitted the plaintiffs to remove their shoes and socks, and exhibit their bare
feet to the jury.266 The supreme court disagreed, noting that "an inspection of
[the foot] would ordinarily afford some indication of the race. 267 The supreme
court affirmed the judgment of freedom although it could not resist announcing
that it considered the jury's verdict contrary to the weight of the evidence.268
Thus, the free status of the Guy family was finally confirmed only weeks
before the outbreak of the Civil War.
269
In a second emancipation case involving the question of the plaintiff's
race, the court was again hostile to emancipation. Gary v. Stevenson270 was a
suit by a sixteen-year-old male named Gary who claimed to be the son of
Thomas Gary and a white woman with whom Thomas Gary cohabited in
Alabama. Thomas Gary moved to Louisiana, and after marrying another
woman, sent his son to live with a man named Armstrong, "who was to keep
and maintain him until his father should see fit to call for him.",271 Armstrong
died and the administrator of Armstrong's estate asked a man named Holman
to take Gary back to his father in Louisiana. Holman instead sold Gary as a
slave to Stevenson, who lived in Crawford County, Arkansas, with the
understanding that Stevenson would liberate Gary when he reached the age of
twenty-one.272 Thomas Gary, the plaintiff's putative father, then appeared on
the scene and asserted that the teenager was his slave. At this point, with both
his father and Stevenson claiming him as a slave, the younger Gary absconded
"that he might the better have an opportunity to assert his right to freedom in
a Court of justice., 273 Stevenson further complicated matters by delivering a
bill of sale conveying the teenager to Brown. Rather than bring an action for
false imprisonment, as permitted by Arkansas law, Gary's attorney sought an
injunction in chancery court to prevent any of the persons claiming Gary as a
265. Daniel v. Guy, 23 Ark. 50 (1861).
266. Two physicians had testified in the first trial that the feet were among the physical
characteristics that distinguish the races. Daniel, 19 Ark. at 127.
267. Daniel, 23 Ark. at 52.
268. Id. at 55.
269. Guy later sued Daniel to secure the return of personal property seized by Daniel when
he reduced her to slavery, but the supreme court sustained Daniel's plea that the statute of
limitations had run on the right to recover the property. Daniel v. Roper, 24 Ark. 131 (1863).
270. 19 Ark. 580 (1858).
271. Id. at 581. The source of the quoted language, which appears in the court's opinion,
is unclear.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 582.
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slave from commencing suit for his possession or otherwise attempting to
restrain his liberty.274
As in Guy v. Daniel, the lower court in Gary v. Stevenson heard
pseudoscientific testimony from three doctors on the physiognomic differences
between the black and white races. The testimony of the doctors, while
somewhat tentative, tended to support the plaintiff's assertion that he was
white.275 The defendants, however, offered uncontroverted testimony that Gary
was the son of a female slave who had been emancipated in accordance with
Arkansas law some two years earlier.27 6 The circuit court dismissed the action,
the plaintiff appealed, and the supreme court affirmed the dismissal. The court
agreed with the trial court that the preponderance of the testimony showed that
the plaintiff was of African descent, thereby invoking the evidentiary
presumption that he was a slave "notwithstanding the admixture of African
blood may be but smal.'2 7 The only evidence offered at trial, according to the
court, supported rather than repelled that presumption. This comment probably
refers to the uncontested testimony that the plaintiff's mother was a slave.278
The decision suggests that in determining race direct evidence of African
ancestry was more important than physical appearance. Gary's attorney
probably committed a tactical error when he sued for injunctive relief. Had he
framed the action as one for false imprisonment, the question of Gary's race
would have been submitted to a jury which might have given more weight to
Gary's physical appearance.
V. CONCLUSION
Although emancipation was not the precise issue, one final case sums up
the court's views on the institution of slavery as well as Arkansans of African
descent. In Ewell v. Tidwel1279 a slave owner had executed a will that freed
most of his slaves and bequeathed to the newly freed slaves the remainder of
his estate, consisting of lands, personal property, and a slave named Charles.28 °
The precise issue before the court was the ownership of Charles. The other
heirs of the slave owner claimed that freed slaves could not legally own
slaves28 ' and that Charles became their property.
274. Id.
275. All witnesses agreed that Gary had light, straight hair, a sandy complexion, and blue
or grey eyes. Id. at 583-584. The testimony is discussed in MORRIS, supra note 46, at 27.
276. Gary, 19 Ark. at 584.
277. Id. at 586.
278. Id. at 584.
279. 20 Ark. 136 (1859).
280. Id. at 137.
281. Taylor reports several instances of freed slaves purchasing slaves in Arkansas, but
[Vol. 19
SLAVERY AND THE SUPREME COURT
The court rejected a Georgia Supreme Court decision holding that free
blacks should not be permitted to own property of any description:
The negro, though morally and mentally inferior to the white man, is,
nevertheless, an intellectual being, with feelings, necessities and habits
common to humanity. By the act of emancipation, the reciprocal
obligations and duties between master and slave, by which the slave owes
obedience and fidelity to the master, and the master owes to the slave
support and protection, are ended. When this takes place, no one is
interested in the protection of the negro. If, under such circumstances, he
could not make and enforce contracts, it is difficult to understand how he
could, with any certainty, supply his commonest necessities. Such a
condition would be inconsistent with civilization. And, besides this, the
negro, having no power to acquire property, or certain means of gathering
the fruits of his labor, every incentive to industry would be at once
destroyed; and, sinking into idleness and depravity, he would become an
intolerable nuisance.282
But, said the court, whether a freed slave could own a slave was an entirely
different question:
There is a striking difference between the black and white man, in intellect,
feelings and principles. In the order of providence, the former was made
inferior to the latter; and hence the bondage of the one to the other. For
government and protection, the one race is dependent on the other. It is
upon this principle alone, that slavery can be maintained as an institution.
The bondage of one negro to another, has not this solid foundation to rest
upon. The free negro finds in the slave his brother in blood, in color,
feelings, education and principle. He has but few civil rights, nor can have,
consistent with the good order of society; and is almost as dependent on the
white race as the slave himself. He is, therefore, civilly and morally
disqualified to extend protection, and exercise dominion over the slave. 3
More than any other case, this holding demonstrates the supreme court's
conviction that the institution of slavery was legally and morally justified by
differences between the races. The law could recognize slaves as persons but
only when that recognition promoted rather than jeopardized the racial
dominance on which slavery was based. In an article discussing the colonial
and antebellum slave laws of Virginia, Judge Higginbotham uses a topic
heading that succinctly describes the attitude of the antebellum Arkansas
these appear to be cases in which the purchaser's purpose was to free a relative from slavery.
TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 254.
282. Ewell, 20 Ark. at 143.
283. Id.
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Supreme Court toward the slave-always property, sometimes a person, and
never a citizen.
284. Id. at 144. Higginbotham & Jacobs, supra note 47, at 971.
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